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WHAT IF I WANT MY KIDS TO WATCH PORNOGRAPHY?:
PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM "INDECENT" SPEECH
Ashutosh Bhagwat"
Under current First Amendment doctrine, a law directed at indecent speech is
treated as "content-based" regulation of speech, and thus must satisfy the "strict
scrutiny" test to survive constitutional challenge - the regulation must be narrowly
tailored to advance a compelling state interest. A number of laws regulating
indecent speech have been passed in recent years, and when challenged, the
government has defended these regulations on the ground that the State has a
compelling interest in the protection of children from harmful materials.
Underlying this argument, however, is a deep ambiguity regarding the precise
nature of the government's legitimate objectives in this area. While the government
may have an interest in facilitating parental supervision over their children's
access to indecent speech, some courts have found the government to have an
independent interest in restricting minors' access to indecent materials. In this
Article, Professor Bhagwat explores the nature of the government's interest in
protecting children from indecent speech. He argues that the existence of such an
independent interest is relevant to the constitutionality of statutes regulating
indecent speech - as opposed to those that merely enhance the effectiveness of
parental supervision - and he criticizes the Supreme Court'sfailure to develop a
coherent theory or approach to evaluating governmental interests.
In recent years, Congress has passed a spate of legislation restricting the
dissemination of so-called "indecent" speech - generally understood to mean
sexually explicit speech' - over various modem mass media. Examples include
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<bhagwata@uchastings.edu>. I would like to thank Reuel Schiller, Geoffrey Stone, Eugene
Volokh, and participants at a faculty works-in-progress workshop at Hastings College of Law
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' Though the precise definition of "indecent" speech varies, the most widely accepted
definition is "'language that describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community standards. . . , sexual or excretory activities and organs. . .. '
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 732 (1978) (quoting Pacifica Found Station WBAI
(FM), 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 98 (1975)); see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 871 (1997). It
should be noted, however, that "indecent" speech is not simply pornography; as discussed
further below, even materials that many would consider socially valuable and appropriate for
some minors, such as frank discussions of sexuality or AIDS, might qualify as "indecent" in
some communities. See id. at 878 (explaining that the terms "indecent" and "patently
offensive" could cover "discussions about prison rape or safe sexual practices, artistic images
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restrictions on "dial-a-porn" telephone services,2 restrictions on indecent radio and
television broadcasts,3 restrictions on indecent cable television programming,4 and
restrictions on indecent speech on the Internet.' Under current First Amendment
doctrine, sexually explicit speech is accorded full constitutional protection so long
as it is not "obscene" under the very strict Miller test, which requires, among other
things, that the "the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value."6 Furthermore, regulations specifically directed at indecent
speech are treated as "content-based" regulations because they single out particular
speech based on its content and therefore are presumptively unconstitutional. To
survive First Amendment scrutiny, the regulations must satisfy the "strict scrutiny"
that include nude subjects, and arguably the card catalogue of the Carnegie Library").
2 See Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (striking down.
47 U.S.C. § 223(b) insofar as it imposed an absolute ban on "indecent" interstate telephone
communications); Info. Providers' Coalition for Def. of the First Amendment v. FCC, 928
F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding the successor version of 47 U.S.C. § 223(b), enacted in
response to the Supreme Court's Sable decision).
' See Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc)
(upholding Section 16(a) of the Public Telecommunications Act of 1992, 47 U.S.C. § 303,
which limited indecent radio and television broadcasts to nighttime hours).
4 See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000) (striking down
Section 505 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,47 U.S.C. § 56 1, which required cable
television operators to "fully scramble or otherwise fully block," during daytime hours,
channels "primarily dedicated to sexually-oriented programming"); Denver Area Educ.
Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996) (upholding in part and striking
down in part Section 10 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act
of 1992, 47 U.S.C. §§ 532(h), 532(j) and 531, which restricted in various ways the
transmission of "indecent" programming on leased access and public access channels).
' See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002) (reversing appellate decision striking
down the Child Online Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 231, which prohibited making indecent
communications for commercial purposes on the World Wide Web that will be available to
minors); Reno, 521 U.S. at 859 (striking down the Communications Decency Act of 1996,
47 U.S.C. §§ 223(a) & (d), which prohibited the transmission of "indecent" and "patently
offensive" communications on the Internet).
6 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). Miller stated that obscene speech is
entirely unprotected under the First Amendment. The test for obscenity is:
(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken
as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. (citations omitted).
One caveat is necessary here: In Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), the
Supreme Court held that the State may prohibit the sale to minors of speech that is obscene
as to minors, even if the speech would be protected as to adults. The significance and limits
of the Ginsberg decision are discussed further in Part I infra.
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test, meaning that the government must prove that the regulation is narrowly
tailored to advance a compelling government interest.7 This test is extremely
difficult to satisfy and was once famously described as "'strict' in theory and fatal
in fact."8
Unsurprisingly, each of Congress's new indecency regulations have been
subjected to constitutional challenge, and most have been struck down.9 In at least
one important case, however, a regulation of indecent speech was upheld under
strict scrutiny,'0 suggesting that strict scrutiny is not fatal in fact in the area of
indecent speech." In each of these cases, the government sought to defend its
indecency regulations on the grounds that they advanced the State's compelling
interest in "protecting children from harmful materials,"' 2 and courts generally have
accepted this interest without comment or argument." Underlying this seeming
consensus, however, a deep ambiguity persists regarding the precise nature of the
government's legitimate objectives in this area. On the one hand, the government
may have an interest in supporting and facilitating parental supervision over their
children's access to sexually explicit speech. This interest is quite uncontroversial,
but as I discuss below, it ultimately supports only limited regulation of indecent
speech. In the leading case involving regulation of children's access to sexual
speech, however, the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he State also has an independent
interest in the well-being of its youth."' 4 Thus, at least according to some courts,
Action for Children's Television, 58 F.3d at 659.
Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972).
9 See supra notes 2-5.
10 See Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc)
(upholding requirement limiting broadcasting of indecent materials to nighttime hours); cf
Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996) (upholding
statutory provision permitting cable operators to bar indecent speech from "leased access"
channels).
" I have argued elsewhere that the weakening of strict scrutiny in recent years is a more
general trend. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Hard Cases and the (D)Evolution of Constitutional
Doctrine, 30 CoNN. L. REv. 961, 965 & n.13 (1998).
12 See, e.g., Reno, 521 U.S. at 875; Actionfor Children's Television, 58 F.3d at 660-63.
'3 See Catherine J. Ross, Anything Goes: Examining the State's Interest in Protecting
Children from Controversial Speech, 53 VAND. L. REv. 427,429 (2000) ("Confronted with
the incantation that the state aims to safeguard children, courts at every level, including the
Supreme Court, have regularly failed to scrutinize the interest alleged by the government.").
Professor Ross continued by arguing that the government had failed to produce sufficient
empirical evidence to support its claims that what she called "controversial" speech harms
children. As discussed in more detail below, I am dubious that the government has any
obligation to make such an empirical showing.
" Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,640 (1968) (upholding ban on sale to minors of
materials "harmful to minors"); see also Action for Children's Television, 58 F.3d at 661
("[W]e believe the Government's own interest in the well-being of minors provides an
2003]
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the government's interest in protecting children turns out to have two distinct facets:
(1) facilitating parental supervision; and (2) independently restricting minors'
access to sexually explicit materials. The second, independent interest is quite
important because it would justify far broader regulation of sexually explicit
materials than the first,15 a point that became a center of controversy between the
majority and dissent in the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Playboy
Entertainment Group.6
In this Article, I explore the nature of the government's interest in regulating
indecent materials to protect children. The caselaw on this subject is hopelessly
ambiguous and, to a substantial extent, internally inconsistent. Nonetheless, the
issue is an important one to resolve, because if properly analyzed, the
constitutionality of many modem indecency regulations turns on whether the
government has an independent interest in controlling children's access to indecent
materials. In particular, the existence of such an independent interest is highly
relevant to the constitutionality of statutes that directly censor indecent speech, as
opposed to regulatory measures that merely enhance the effectiveness of parent-
controlled screening devices. I argue, moreover, that the controversy and
uncertainty in this area highlight a greater problem with the Supreme Court's
constitutional jurisprudence: the lack of any coherent theory or approach towards
evaluating governmental interests.'7 Thus, the question of why the government is
permitted to regulate indecent speech is interesting both intrinsically and because
of the insights it offers into the current state of constitutional law.
I. PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM INDECENCY: THE JUDICIAL VIEW
A. Background: Children, Pornography and the Internet
The Supreme Court has struggled with the question of the government's power
independent justification for the regulation of broadcast indecency.").
'5 Of course, even if the government establishes a compelling interest, it still must prove
that any regulation is narrowly tailored to advance that interest, a requirement which raises
its own set of complex problems. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Shielding
Children, and Transcending Balancing, 1997 SuP. CT. REV. 141, 148-56 (discussing
ambiguities in the Court's current implementation of the narrow tailoring standard in the
context of indecent speech, because the Court has seemed to strike down regulations even
when no equally effective, less restrictive regulatory options are available); see also Sable
Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 131-33 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
6 529 U.S. 803 (2000). In particular, the majority questioned the existence of an
independent interest, whereas the dissent strongly defended it. See infra Part 1.B for further
discussion of the Playboy decision.
'7 This aspect of the Article draws upon previous work that I have published on this
question. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CAL. L.
REV. 297 (1997).
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to protect children from sexually explicit speech for as long as the Court has
accorded constitutional protection to such speech." In 1957, the Court held in
Butler v. Michigan that the State may not absolutely prohibit the sale of "lewd"
material that might harm children, because the State may not "reduce the adult
population of Michigan to reading only what is fit for children."' 9 However, the
1968 decision in Ginsberg v. New York is undoubtedly the leading case recognizing
the power of the State to protect children."0 The Court in Ginsberg upheld a New
York statute barring the sale to minors of materials deemed obscene as to minors,
using a variant of the standard definition of obscenity.2 The Court recognized two
distinct interests that the State could advance as justification for such a challenged
law:
First of all, constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that
the parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct the
rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our society .... The
legislature could properly conclude that parents and others, teachers for
example, who have this primary responsibility for children's well-being
are entitled to the support of laws designed to aid discharge of that
responsibility.22
In contrast to this, however, the Court also noted that the "State also has an
independent interest in the well-being of its youth" and therefore may ban the sale
to minors of sexually .explicit materials which might harm the "ethical and moral
development" of children.23 The Court also rejected the contention that in order to
regulate, the State must demonstrate the existence of such harm with "scientific"
evidence, concluding instead that so long as "it was not irrational for the legislature
to find that exposure to materials condemned by the statute is harmful to minors,"
the statute would be upheld.24 Ginsberg thus firmly established the power of the
State to protect children from the "harms," purported or real, caused by exposure
to sexual speech and also endorsed the dual nature of the State's interests in this
lB Until the late 1950s, and in particula until the Supreme Court's decision in Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), courts-by adopting avery broad definition of the term
"obscene"-placed few restrictions on the State's power to completely ban sexually explicit
materials. Thus, the specific question of the State's power to protect children from materials
deemed protected-as to adults simply did not arise.
'9 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957); see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234,
250-55 (2002).
20 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
21 Id.
22 Id. at 639.
23 Id. at640-41.
24 Id.
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regard.2" It should be noted, however, that unlike most of the modem indecency
cases, Ginsberg only involved a prohibition on sales to minors of speech deemed
constitutionally unprotected as to them; it did not involve any restrictions on adults'
access to protected speech and, therefore, did not involve the application of strict
scrutiny or any level of heightened scrutiny under the modem doctrinal framework.
Instead, because it placed the restricted speech in the "obscenity/unprotected
speech" category, the Ginsberg Court appears to have applied a form of rational
basis review.
Since Ginsberg, the Court has decided a large number of cases involving
restrictions on indecent speech imposed in the name of protecting minors, and in all,
of these cases (until the recent Playboy Entertainment Group decision discussed
below), the Court has continued to recognize the legitimacy of the two government
interests identified in Ginsberg. For example, in Federal Communications
Commission v. Pacifica Foundation,6 the Court relied on Ginsberg to uphold a
Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") decision that sanctioned a radio
station for broadcasting "indecent" language during daytime hours. In Sable
Communications of California v. Federal Communications Commission," in
contrast, the Court struck down a flat congressional ban on the interstate
transmission of indecent commercial telephone messages, but it did so on "narrow
tailoring" grounds (the second part of the Court's "strict scrutiny" test), accepting
without question the government's "compelling interest in protecting the physical
and psychological well-being of minors."2 In Sable, the Court for the first time
elevated the government interests recognized in Ginsberg to the level of compelling
interests, sufficiently powerful to satisfy strict scrutiny, the highest standard of
review. The Court took this important doctrinal step summarily, without carefully
detailing the criteria for defining compelling interests and without examining the
inapplicability of the precedents upon which it relied.29
More recently, the Court has been faced with a number of cases involving
restrictions on sexual speech - imposed in the name of protecting children - in
the context of more modem communications media, specifically cable television
and the Internet. Once again, the Court has generally accepted the government's
asserted justifications with little skepticism, focusing instead on whether the
challenged regulations were "narrowly tailored." In Denver Area Educational
Telecommunications Consortium v. Federal Communications Commission, ° the
Court was faced with a challenge to a congressional statute imposing various
25 See id.
26 438 U.S. 726, 749-50 (1978).
27 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
8 Id. at 126.
29 See Ross, supra note 13, at 465.
30 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
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restrictions on the transmission of indecent materials on leased access and public
access cable television channels.3 In a highly splintered opinion, the Court struck
down two of the three restrictions. The divisions within the Court centered on
issues of tailoring and defining the proper standard of review, and establishing the
nature of the constitutional rights of cable operators. No member of the Court
seriously questioned the strength or legitimacy of the government's interest in
protecting children.32 Similarly, in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union,33 the
Court struck down the Communications Decency Act ("CDA"), a federal statute
that effectively prohibited the transmission or posting on the Internet of indecent
speech directed at, or available to, minors. Once again, the Court accepted without
question "the governmental interest in protecting children from harmful
materials,"34 but also found that the CDA was not narrowly tailored.35
Thus, in the thirty years following the Ginsberg decision, the Court paid no
serious attention to the precise basis or nature of the government's asserted interests
in protecting children from sexual materials described and endorsed in Ginsberg.
In particular, the Court never questioned whether the Ginsberg decision was correct
in identifying a purported independent government interest in controlling minors'
access to sexual materials, regardless of the wishes of their parents. The lower
federal courts have largely followed the Court's lead in this regard, relying on an
undifferentiated State interest in "protecting minors from the harms concededly
generated by indecent [speech]. '36
"' Leased access channels are channels which, under federal law; the cable operator must
reserve for commercial leasing by third parties. Public access channels are channels which
local franchising authorities have required cable operators to set aside for use by the public
(or by the government itself).
32 See Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 743, 755 (plurality opinion); id. at 779 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); id at 806 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part,
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
33 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
31 Id. at 875; cf id. at 878:
[Tihe strength of the Government's interest in protecting minors is not equally
strong throughout.the coverage of this broad statute. Under the CDA, a parent
allowing her 17-year-old to use the family computer to obtain information on the
Internet that she, in her parental judgment, deems appropriate could face a
lengthy prison term.... Similarly, a parent who sent his 17-year-old college
freshman information on birth control via e-mail could be incarcerated.
31 In the wake of the Court's ACLU decision, Congress adopted a new statute attempting
to protect children from indecency on the Internet: the Child Online Protection Act
("COPA"). In Ashcrofi v. American Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564 (2002), the Supreme
Court reversed a Third Circuit decision striking down COPA on overbreadth grounds, but
the enforcement of the statute remains enjoined as of this writing, and litigation over its
constitutionality continues.
36 Dial Info. Servs. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 938 F.2d 1535, 1541 (2d Cir. 1991); see also
ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 173 (3d Cir. 2000), rev'd sub nom. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535
20031
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B. ACT III and Playboy Entertainment Group: The End of Consensus
For almost thirty-years, in cases involving challenges to regulations designed
to protect minors from sexually explicit or "indecent" speech, a broad judicial
consensus regarding the strength and legal sufficiency of the government's asserted
interests in protecting children thus appears to have existed. The only debate has
focused on whether particular regulatory measures are sufficiently tailored to meet
that goal. Underlying that consensus, a deep-seated ambiguity has remained
regarding the precise nature of the governmental interest. In particular, courts have
been uncertain whether the government's goal is - and should be -to aid parental
control over children's moral upbringing or, instead, to assert its own interests in
controlling the moral development of children. By and large, courts have tended to
ignore that ambiguity, apparently considering it irrelevant. In recent years,
however, that consensus has weakened, and more sustained attention has been given
to the ambiguities surrounding the Ginsberg formulation of the government's
interests in this area. Particularly, in two relatively recent decisions, judges have
recognized that the nature of the government's interest does matter to constitutional
analysis and have explicitly grappled with these problems.
First, in 1995, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit decided Action for Children's Television v. Federal Communications
Commission (hereinafter ACT III), 7 in which the en banc court was faced with a
challenge to a statute, along with the implementing FCC regulations, that required
radio and television broadcasters to "channel" indecent materials to the hours
between midnight and 6 a.m. A majority of the court, in an opinion by Judge
U.S. 564 (2002) (holding that the "government has a compelling interest in protecting
children from material that is harmful to them"); Info. Providers' Coalition for Def. of the
First Amendment v. FCC, 928 F.2d 866, 872-74 (9th Cir. 1991) (failing to examine nature
of governmental interest at all); Fabulous Assocs. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm., 896
F.2d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that the "interest of the state in shielding its youth from
exposure to indecent materials is a compelling state interest"); Carlin Comms., Inc. v. FCC,
837 F.2d 546, 555 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding that the governmental interest was to "protect
minors from obscene speech"); Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989, 996 (10th Cir. 1986)
(Baldock, J., specially concurring) ("protection of minors"); PSINet v. Chapman, 167 F.
Supp. 2d 878, 884 (W.D. Va. 2001) (stating that "the state's asserted interest in protecting,
and helping parents to protect, minors from sexually explicit materials is compelling"). In
Fabulous Associates, the court considered the possibility of a clash between governmental
and parental desires, and concluded with little analysis that the parental interest should trump
in that circumstance. Fabulous Associates, 896 F.2d at 788; see also PSINet, 167 F. Supp.
2d at 885-86 (recognizing an independent state interest in protecting children and the
possibility of conflict with parental desires, but dismissing its significance by analogy to non-
speech related areas where the governmental policies sometimes trump parental values).
" 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc). That decision was the last in a series of cases
involving challenges to regulations limiting the broadcast of indecent materials.
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Buckley, upheld the policy in large part, holding that even though the challenged
rules were content-based regulations of speech, and thus subject to strict scrutiny,
they survived such scrutiny because the rules were narrowly tailored to advance the
government's dual goals of facilitating parental supervision and protecting the
"ethical and moral development" of children.3" The majority, however, clearly
relied more heavily on the latter independent governmental interest, emphasizing
that: (1) the government had no obligation to provide empirical evidence that
exposure to sexual materials harmed children; and (2) the government's role in
producing moral citizens was an important aspect of democratic self-government
(quoting Irving Kristol no less).39 The majority also noted that, in its view, the two
goals were "complementary" rather than in tension with each other.40
The dissenters in ACT III, Judges Edwards and Wald (the latter joined by
Judges Rogers and Tatel) parted company with the majority on both of these crucial
assumptions, thereby bringing to the forefront the tensions and ambiguities in the
Ginsberg formulation of the government's interests in this area. In particular, Judge
Edwards argued in a lengthy dissent that, in the context of this case, the two
interests upon which the majority relied were inevitably in conflict with each other
because a flat ban on daytime broadcast of indecent materials, while undoubtedly
advancing the government's own purported interest in shielding children, could not
advance parental supervision unless parents happened to precisely share the FCC's
views on how best to raise children.4' And as for the government's independent
interest, Judge Edwards argued that the government had failed to meet its burden
of empirically demonstrating that exposure to sexually explicit materials causes
children any harm. 2 Similarly, Judge Wald in dissent argued that "the primary
government interest here must be in facilitating parental supervision of children"
because the government failed to demonstrate any real harm caused by exposure to
sexual materials.43 Furthermore, because the government failed to demonstrate that
parents could not adequately supervise children during daytime hours, it also failed
to establish that a flat ban on daytime broadcasts was necessary or narrowly
tailored." In short, the dispute between the majority and dissenting judges in ACT
III clearly exposed the potential conflict between the two governmental interests
relied upon by the Supreme Court in Ginsberg and subsequent cases. It also
demonstrated that the question of which of those interests the government may
properly rely upon has important consequences for regulatory authority.
8 Id. at 660-63 (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 641 (1968)).
39 Action for Children's Television, 58 F.3d at 662-63.
40 Id. at 663.
41 Id at 678-79 & n.29 (Edwards, C.J., dissenting).
42 Id. at 680-82.
43 Id. at 686-88 (Wald, J., dissenting).
44 Jd at 687-88; see also id. at 682-83 (Edwards, C.J., dissenting).
2003]
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Five years after ACTIIl, this simmering dispute over the meaning of Ginsberg
and its progeny finally came to the Supreme Court in United States v. Playboy
Entertainment Group.45 The Playboy case involved a challenge to a congressional
statute - Sectioi 505 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 - which required
cable television operators who carried channels "primarily dedicated to sexually
oriented programming" to take one of two steps: either (1) to "fully scramble or
otherwise fully block" such channels, so that no "signal bleed" occurred permitting
viewers to see fleeting images of sexual programming; or (2) to limit transmission
of such channels to nighttime hours (set by the FCC to between 10 p.m. and 6
a.m.).46 Because complete blocking was not economically feasible, the vast
majority of operators were forced to select the second option - time-channeling the
targeted programming."7 The Supreme Court, in a five to four decision authored by
Justice Kennedy, struck down Section 505, holding that it was not narrowly tailored
to advance its admittedly compelling goal of facilitating parental control over their
children's access to sexual images or sounds via signal bleed, because Section 504
of the Telecommunications Act provided a less restrictive means for achieving the
same end.4S Section 504 requires cable operators, upon request by a customer, to
individually, fully block any channels designated by the customer.49 As such,
according to the majority, this provision fully protected a parent's interest in
shielding his or her children from any type of programming, regardless of sexual
content.50 Crucially, in reaching this conclusion, the Court explicitly considered
and rejected the government's argument that Section 505 was necessary to advance
the government's independent interest in protecting children from signal bleed.5
The majority first expressed doubt about whether such an interest even existed, and
held that in any event, such an interest could be implicated only if parents were
unable themselves to act on behalf of their children.52 In short, the majority seemed
to altogether reject the notion that the government might have a completely
independent interest in fostering the "ethical and moral development" of children,
41 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
46 Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 505, 47 U.S.C. § 560 (1996).
47 Playboy, 529 U.S. at 809.
4 Id at 825-26.
'9 47 U.S.C. § 560 (1996).
SO Playboy, 529 U.S. at 809.
s'Id at 824-26.
52 Id at 825 (arguing that the independent governmental interest alone could not justify
intervention by the State, "[elven [given] the assumption that the Government has an interest
in substituting itself for informed and empowered parents...").
[Vol. 11:671680
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which could supersede or substitute for the desires of parents."
In contrast to the majority, the primary dissent - authored by Justice Breyer-
fully accepted the legitimacy of the government's independent interest in shielding
children. Justice Breyer relied heavily upon that interest in arguing to uphold
Section 505,' pointing out, in particular, that the voluntary blocking mechanism of
Section 504 "does nothing at all to further" the Government's independent
compelling interest in shielding children." It seems clear that this disagreement
was extremely significant to the case's final outcome. Its importance is highlighted
by the fact that the existence of an independent government interest became a point
of contention during the government's oral argument. Faced with a question
suggesting that Section 504 might provide a less restrictive means to achieve the
government's goals, the attorney for the government emphasized the State's
independent interest in protecting children, which in turn elicited a dubious
comment that "the Government is a kind of super parent."56 In both its opening and
reply briefs, the government relied heavily upon the existence of an independent
interest in protecting children by refuting the argument that Section 504 provided
a more narrowly tailored means to achieve its ends. In particular, the government
argued that because of parental "inertia, indifference or distraction," parents will
fail to act to protect their children and, therefore, the government must step in."
Although the briefs for Playboy did not explicitly address this issue (arguing
Id. at 825-26. The majority opinion is slightly ambiguous on the last point because it
seems to leave open the possibility that if the government could demonstrate that parents who
were aware of their children's exposure to sexual materials still did not act, then perhaps the
Government could step in on its own behalf. See id.
" Id. at 842 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("I could not disagree more when the majority implies
that the Government's independent interest in offering such protection - preventing, say,
an 8-year-old child from watching virulent pornography without parental consent - might
not be 'compelling."').
11 Id. at 843. Admittedly, however, even the dissent hedged somewhat about the existence
and strength of an independent governmental interest by describing it as an interest in
shielding children from watching sexual materials "in the absence of parental consent" or
parental supervision. By doing so, Justice Breyer managed to sidestep the obvious and
difficult question of what power the government has to act contrary to a parent's values, and
perhaps even to trump a parent's desire to expose a minor to controversial speech (though
in reality, given the range of speech options available to parents, such a scenario is unlikely
to arise). As I discuss further below, the dissent's inability to face this problem head-on is
indicative of the general jurisprudential confusion in this area, a product of the fact that the
Court has failed to develop any methodology or jurisprudence regarding the identification
of compelling governmental interests.
56 See Transcript of Oral Argument, Playboy (No. 98-1682), 1999 U.S. TRANS LEXIS
60, at * 18-*20.
" See Brief for the Appellants at *16-18, *32-*35, Playboy (No. 98-1682), 1999 WL
700620; Reply Brief for the Appellants at *12-* 13, Playboy (No. 98-1682), 1999 WL
1021220.
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instead that Section 505 was not narrowly tailored), several amici directly
challenged the government's analysis in this regard." In particular, one amicus-.
the Media Institute - explicitly challenged the government's assertion that it had
an independent interest in protecting children, arguing that any such interest "is
inconsistent with the Government's asserted interest in supporting parents'
authority and ability in inculcating morals and beliefs in their children as they see
fit."' 9  In addition, another amicus - a group of "sexuality" scholars and
therapists - challenged the empirical basis of the government's argument, devoting
much of their brief to demonstrating that there is essentially no scientific evidence
that exposure to sexually explicit images causes psychological harm to children.'
The issue of the existence of an independent governmental interest in protecting
children from sexually explicit materials was thus fully joined before the Court, and
it is not surprising that the Court's division on its resolution proved crucial to the
outcome of the case.
What is peculiar about the ultimate resolution of the Playboy case is that despite
the seemingly clear legal dispute before the Court, and the apparent division within
the Court on its resolution, neither the majority nor the dissent address or resolve
the problem in a straightforward manner. First of all, as noted above, both the
majority and dissenting opinions are in fact somewhat ambiguous in the positions
they adopt. Justice Kennedy's majority opinion, for example, seems to reject an
independent interest, but nowhere explicitly states that no such interest exists. 61 It
appears to leave the door open to the possibility that if the government could
demonstrate that well-informed parents were failing to "protect" their children, then
the government could act. 62 Justice Breyer's dissent, on the other hand, while
loudly trumpeting such an interest, hedges itself by describing the interest as
existing (only?) when a child is exposed to sexual materials without parental
consent or supervision.63 More fundamentally, despite the apparently clear dispute
between the majority and dissent, neither opinion offers any suggestion or analytical
framework for how, and on what basis, this dispute should be resolved. The
disagreement thus comes down to nothing more than sheer assertion and citations
58 See Brief of Appellee, Playboy (No. 98-1682), 1999 WL 756117.
'9 BriefofAmicus Curiae The Media Inst. in Support of Appellee at *24-*26, Playboy
(No. 98-1682), 1999 WL 766039; see also Amicus Curiae Brief for Nat'l Cable Television
Ass'n in Support of Appellee at * 14, Playboy (No. 98-1682), 1999 WL 766083 ("Whether
the Government's paternalistic interest in substituting its judgment for the judgment of a
child's fully informed parents provides a legitimate and compelling basis for content-based
regulation is dubious at best.").
60 Brief of Amici Curiae Sexuality Scholars, Researchers, Educators, and Therapists in
Support of Appellee, Playboy (No. 98-1682), 1999 WL 766040.
61 See Playboy, 529 U.S. at 825-26; supra note 53 and accompanying text.
62 See Playboy, 529 U.S. at 825-26; supra note 53 and accompanying text.
63 Playboy, 529 U.S. at 842-43; supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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to precedent which are not truly on point and are themselves entirely lacking in
analysis.
This ellipsis is moreover indicative of a greater gap in the Court's
jurisprudence: its failure to give any sustained attention to the problem of how to
determine whether particular asserted governmental interests qualify as
"compelling" (or for that matter as "important" or "legitimate," as required by the
other levels of the Court's three-tiered doctrinal framework). I have discussed this
phenomenon elsewhere in greater detail and will not repeat it here, but suffice it to
say that despite the fact that the Court has recognized the concept of "strict
scrutiny" since the 1944 Korematsu decision,"4 and has used the term "compelling
interest" for almost as long, the Court has never provided a sustained explanation
of how such interests are to be identified or evaluated.65 Without such an analytical
framework, however, the disagreement dividing the Court in Playboy, and casting
its shadow across many other First Amendment cases, is necessarily unresolvable.
11. PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM WHAT?: A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE
In cases involving regulations of indecent speech, the government has asserted,
and the courts have recognized, two primary governmental interests justifying such
regulation: (1) facilitating parental supervision of children; and (2) shielding
children from indecent materials. The first interest - facilitating parental
control - unsurprisingly has proven entirely uncontroversial. The reason for this
consensus seems to be a fairly universal agreement that parents can and should
control their children's upbringing, including controlling their moral and cultural
development, and that under modem circumstances the government can and should
assist parents in this regard. Indeed, the Supreme Court has long accorded
independent constitutional significance to the parental "right" to control their
children's upbringing, holding as far back as 1923 that parents have a liberty
interest in controlling their children's education free of arbitrary state intervention.66
If a parent's right to control her children's upbringing hasconstitutional status, it
seems only natural that the government should have a compelling interest in
facilitating exercise of that right, or so most courts seem to believe.6
'4 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
65 See Bhagwat, supra note 17, at 307-08 & n.33; see also Ashutosh Bhagwat,
Affirmative Action and Compelling Interests: Equal Protection Jurisprudence at the
Crossroads, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 260, 270-72 (2002).
' Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,
65 (2000) (holding that a statute granting unlimited visitation rights to children violated a
parent's constitutional right related to the "care, custody, and control of [her] children");
Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that parents may not be required to
send their children to public school).
67 Of course, the validity of this "compelling interest" is not universally accepted. For
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Given the almost universal acceptance of a compelling interest in facilitating
parental control, the debate in this area has focused on the existence of an
independent governmental right to control and participate in the "ethical and moral
development" of children. And as noted above, in recent years that debate has been
joined in earnest. Unfortunately, however, the debate has consisted largely of
undefended assertions and unexamined assumptions rather than any sustained
analysis. The underlying problem here is that although the Supreme Court has
provided isolated answers to isolated questions regarding the strength and
legitimacy of particular governmental interests, 8 it has not offered any systematic
method or analytical framework for resolving those questions. Instead, it has
treated each separate asserted interest as raising an ad hoc question, to be resolved
on an ad hoc basis. The consequence of this absence of a legal analytical
framework is that debate over the validity of asserted governmental interests
primarily has focused on empirical questions, because - perhaps reasonably
courts and litigants have tended to treat the issues raised as ones of fact.69
In the specific context of indecency regulation, this tendency has manifested
itself in a debate over whether the government should be required to demonstrate
empirically that exposure to indecent materials "harms" children. The State's
failure to do so was the primary basis for Chief Judge Edwards' dissent in ACT111,7°
and it was also an important component of the arguments made by amici to the
Supreme Court in the Playboy case."' In the academic arena, Professor Catherine
Ross has extensively argued this point in an article which broadly examined the
example, Professor Catherine Ross has argued that such an interest cannot generally justify
regulation of speech because of heterogeneity among families. See Ross, supra note 13, at
472-93. Judge Posner has also argued that there must be some limits on the parental right to
seek government assistance in controlling children's access to controversial materials. See
Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 2001). As discussed
below, I question the validity of the syllogism upon which courts seem to rely, but for
somewhat different reasons than Professor Ross or Judge Posner. See infra notes 122-41 and
accompanying text.
6 Two recent examples of such analysis are Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)
(holding that a state has no legitimate interest in seeking to harm an unpopular group), and
California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 582-85 (2000) (rejecting various
governmental interests asserted in support of California's "blanket primary" system as either
illegitimate or not compelling).
69 For a discussion of this phenomenon in the context of the modern affirmative action
debate, see Bhagwat, supra note 65, at 265-70.
70 Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 680-82 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(Edwards, C.J., dissenting).
"' See Brief Amici Curiae of Sexuality Scholars, Researchers, Educators, and Therapists
in Support of Appellee, United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000)
(No. 98-1682), 1999 WL 766040.
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State's interest in "protecting children."72
The canonical response to this empirical argument is the one offered by the
majority in ACT III Under Supreme Court precedent, notably the Ginsberg
decision, the State is not required to provide "empirical" evidence that exposure to
sexually explicit materials may harm children, because legislators are permitted to
assume such harm based on common cultural understandings." There is, of course,
a problem with this reliance on Ginsberg as a strictly legal matter, since as noted
earlier, Ginsberg did not involve strict scrutiny or a compelling governmental
interest.74 But beyond the doctrinal difficulty, there is a deeper ambiguity here. The
empirical arguments described above tend to focus on proof, or lack thereof,
regarding psychological harm to children-caused by exposure to sexually explicit
materials, of which there is quite clearly none.7" In Ginsberg, however, the Court
based the independent governmental interest inprotecting children on concerns
about "ethical and moral development." It also seems quite apparent that legislative
regulation of indecency usually is rooted in ethical and moral concerns, not
concerns about diagnosable, "psychological" harm. Ethical and moral questions,
however, are by their nature not susceptible to empirical or scientific proof; rather,
their answers exist in the eyes of the beholder. This is undoubtedly what the Court
meant in Ginsberg when it said that "[i]t is very doubtful" if the legislative finding
in that case regarding the effect of sexually explicit materials on children "expresses
an accepted scientific fact., 76 Thus, the empirical attacks on the government's
purported independent interest in protecting children miss the point. They
challenge an assertion which is not being made, and fail to address the true
question: whether the State has a legitimate or compelling interest in inculcating
moral and ethical values in children by controlling their access to indecent materials
as a step towards creating a morally virtuous citizenry.77
Posed in those stark terms, it becomes clear that the issues raised by the
indecency cases are exceedingly complex and controversial. Whereas it is widely
accepted that the State may protect children against "harm" in the sense of physical
abuse or neglect, 7 the notion of a government that is responsible for the ethics and
72 Ross, supra note 13, at 501-07.
" Action for Children's Television, 58 F.3d at 661-62.
7 See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
I  am not aware of anyone who seriously disputes the lack of empirical evidence of
harm to children from exposure to sexual materials.
76 Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 641.
'7 See Action for Children's Television, 58 F.3d at 663 (advocating the proposition that,
in a democracy, the Government has a compelling interest in producing a virtuous citizenry)
(citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), and IRVING KRISTOL, ON THE
DEMOCRATIC IDEA IN AMERICA 41-42 (1972)).
7' This was the holding of Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), in which the
Court rejected a claim by a Jehovah's Witness for a religious exemption from state laws
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morality of its citizens - though perhaps consistent with Civic Republican
assumptions - is far more controversial. Even here, however, most people would
accept that in some contexts, the State undoubtedly does have a strong and
legitimate interest in inculcating moral and ethical values - for example, in its
provision of public education79 or in setting conditions for the receipt of public
funds. The question, then, is whether such an interest is properly deployed to
justify censorship of private speech. In other words, does an otherwise powerful
and unexceptionable governmental interest cease to be "compelling," or even
"legitimate," when offered as a justification for a restriction on speech, and if so,
why? The broader question raised here is whether, in evaluating an asserted
governmental interest, it matters what constitutional provision is at issue. I would
argue (and have argued elsewhere"0 ) that the answer is an unequivocal "yes."
Governmental interests that might be sufficient to justify restrictions on free speech
will not necessarily be sufficient tojustify restrictions on abortion, for example, and
vice-versa. Indeed, the constitutional provision at issue should not only be relevant
in assessing governmental interests, it should be determinative.
The above is a controversial proposition, and although a complete defense is not
possible here, some explanation is necessary. There are two basic - and
interrelated - arguments for a Constitution-centered approach to governmental
interests. One reason is rooted in concerns about judicial legitimacy and
competence. It is widely accepted that in light of the countermajoritarian difficulty,
courts exercise power most legitimately when their decisions are rooted in clearly
identifiable positive law, which in the context of constitutional decisions means the
Constitution. In contrast, judicial legitimacy is at its weakest when courts are seen
as simply second-guessing legislative policy determinations. Furthermore, in terms
of institutional competence, courts are best at interpreting and applying specific
legal provisions, as opposed to making ad hoc policy judgments about the strength
of proposed governmental policies. This is because policy decisions require making
empirical and predictive judgments of a sort for which courts have no particular
talent or expertise. Moreover, because of their lack of democratic pedigree,
courts - unlike legislatures - cannot compensate for a lack of expertise by turning
to explicitly political considerations. For these reasons, if a jurisprudence of
governmental interests is to be developed, it must be rooted in the Constitution,
because the alternative, which is an entirely open-ended analysis of whether a
particular asserted interest or policy is sufficiently "compelling" (i.e., is a
sufficiently good idea), takes courts well beyond their competence and their
prohibiting underage employment.
'9 Cf Stanley Ingber, Socialization, Indoctrination, or the "Pall of Orthodoxy": Value
Training in the Public Schools, 1987 U. ILL. L. REv. 15.
"0 See Bhagwat, supra note 17, at 330-41; Bhagwat, supra note 65, at 274.
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legitimate place in a democratic society.8
The above argument provides an institutional and pragmatic justification for
rooting evaluation of governmental interests in constitutional text, but it does not
really provide a theoretical one. It also fails to explain why governmental interests
must be tested against the specific constitutional provision which the State has
allegedly violated. Furtherjustification is necessary, therefore, and it can be found
in the nature of constitutional "rights."
Under the Court's current constitutional doctrine, disputes between the State
and individuals tend to be described as clashes between an individual's
constitutional "right," and a societal interest in limiting that right for the broader
good.82 The greater the intrusion on constitutionally favored rights, the greater the
State's burden to justify such an intrusion. The doctrine captures this idea by
requiring progressively stronger governmental reasons to justify an action
("legitimate" to "important" to "compelling"), as the burdened rights become more
fundamental. In reality, however, this entire structure is deeply deceptive. The
Constitution does not grant "rights" to individuals in such terms at all; rather, it
establishes specified limits on governmental power. Furthermore, those limits
generally are stated in absolute terms, not with caveats for great need. Thus, the
speech clause of the First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech."83 It does not state that "Citizens shall have a
right to free speech," nor does it state that "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech unless it has a good reason to do so." Of course,
the language of the First Amendment requires interpretation. I am not making an
"absolutist" argument regarding free speech. Rather, my argument is that in
determining whether a particular statute or other governmental action violates the
free speech clause, the relevant question should not be whether the government has
a good policy reason for limiting speech, it should be whether the challenged action
constitutes an "abridgment of speech" in the relevant, constitutional sense. In other
words, the question should be whether the action violates some principle derivable
from the First Amendment. This kind of analysis is not necessarily easier than the
policy analysis required by an ad hoc approach to governmental interests (and
seemingly by the Court's current doctrine), but it is a different kind of analysis
because it is a constitutional and legal one. 4
What are the implications of this analytical framework for a purported
independent governmental interest in shielding children from sexually explicit
materials in order to direct their ethical and moral.development? At first cut, the
s' For further development of these arguments, see Bhagwat, supra note 17, at 321-25.
82 See generally David L. Faigman, Madisonian Balancing: A Theory of Constitutional
Adjudication, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 641, 641-44 (1994).
83 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4 See also Bhagwat, supra note 65, at 272-74.
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answer seems clear - such an interest cannot be the basis for regulation which
substantially burdens speech. There seems to be a clear and fatal conflict between
an alleged state interest in inculcating moral values by suppressing disfavored
speech and what is widely accepted to be one of the defining principles of the First
Amendment: The government may not prescribe an "orthodoxy" of belief through
coercive means. This is one of the basic purposes of the free speech clause and has
been accepted by the Court since Justice Jackson made this point most famously in
the Barnette case.8" The principle was restated in the flag burning cases86 and has
been widely endorsed in academic literature. 7 If there is indeed a direct conflict
between an asserted governmental interest and the constitutional provision at issue,
surely the government interest cannot provide ajustification for limiting the scope
of that provision; or put differently, surely a governmental interest that runs directly
contrary to the underlying purposes of a constitutional provision is "illegitimate" 8
and, thus, afortiori not "compelling." Under this line of reasoning, therefore, the
government simply cannotjustify the censorship of speech based on an independent
governmental interest in shielding children from sexually explicit speech, because
the underlying governmental objective in this situation - to control the ethical and
moral development of children by suppressing speech - runs contrary to basic First
Amendment principles and therefore is illegitimate. 9
The difficulty with the above line of reasoning is that it does not consider the
fact that in the indecency cases, the target of the State's attempts to "enforce an
orthodoxy" (i.e., inculcate values) is children, not adults. Even if Barnette and the
8" West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
86 United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 315-19 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397, 410-19 (1989); see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234,245 (2002)
("As a general principal, the First Amendment bars the government from dictating what we
see or read or speak or hear.").
87 See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, Is Moral Relativism a Constitutional Command?, 70 IND. L.
J. 331, 353 (1995) (recognizing the "bedrock principle" of free speech upheld in Barnette
and Johnson); Ingber, supra note 79, at 22 (hailing Barnette, but questioning "the
judiciary's ... insistence that schools serve a socializing function by inculcating societal
beliefs and values"); Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of
Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413,428-37 (1996)
(discussing the dangers of restricting speech based on governmental hostility towards its
content); Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment's Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 818-22
(2001) (attacking the governmental prescription of expressive "orthodoxy"). But see
Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation ofSocial Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943,945-47 (1995)
("[l1t has never been the case that 'officials,' whether high or petty, have been forbidden from
prescribing 'what shall be orthodox' in politics, nationalism, and other matters of
opinion ... .") (footnotes omitted).
88 See Bhagwat, supra note 17, at 330-37.
89 Note that this interest is illegitimate only as a basis for restricting the free speech clause
of the First Amendment; it might be a perfectly acceptable justification for other government
policies, including ones which restrict other constitutional provisions.
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flag-burning cases are correct that the State may not suppress speech in order to
impose upon adults a particular set ofvalues or beliefs favored by the government, 90
the application of that principle to children is less clear. Of course, Barnette itself
involved children in the public school setting.9' But the facts of Barnette were far
more extreme than the indecency cases.92 The government in Barnette attempted
to require children to subscribe to an orthodoxy (by saluting the flag) that was
contrary to their religious beliefs, without any claim that it was seeking to protect
the children from harm. 93 The indecency cases, however, squarely raise the
question of whether the State may properly "protect" children from values and ideas
that, in the view of the State, will cause them "ethical and moral" harm.94
The problem, of course, is that children are different. We widely accept that
children do not enjoy the same level of autonomy or the same range of "rights" as
adults, and in particular, we accept that others - including parents, legal guardians,
and in some circumstances, the State - possess the power to coerce children in
ways unimaginable for adults (mandatory schooling laws being only the most
obvious example).9" The State also has a well-recognized interest in protecting
children from harm, in some instances from harm by the children's own parents.96
Does the anti-orthodoxy principle, then, have any application to children? In fact,
the Supreme Court has made it quite clear that the principle does have some
application - i.e., that the State does not possess unlimited power to shield
children from ideas of which it disapproves. In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,
the Court explicitly made this point by striking down an ordinance prohibiting
drive-in movie theaters from showing any movies containing nudity if visible from
the street.97 Judge Posner recently reached essentially the same conclusion in even
9 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
91 Id. at 624.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 630-3 1.
' One point should be clarified here. The various indecency regulations discussed thus
far have been challenged not because of their effect on children, but because of their effect
on adult speech (the exception being Ginsberg, where there was no impact on adult speech).
In this Article, however, I am not concerned with the legal implications of such incidental
effects - that is an issue of narrow tailoring which Eugene Volokh has analyzed thoroughly
and, in my view, convincingly. See Volokh, supra note 15. My focus here is on the validity
of the government's stated purpose in adopting these laws, which is to protect children
not adults - from speech.
9" See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (permitting drug testing); Ohio
v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990) (restricting abortion rights); Bethel
Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (restricting speech).
9 See supra note 78 and accompanying text (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158 (1944)).
9 422 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1975):
Speech that is neither obscene as to youths nor subject to some other legitimate
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more pointed terms, arguing that children must be provided some access to
information -even controversial information -because "[p]eople are unlikely to
become well-functioning, independent-minded adults and responsible citizens if
they are raised in an intellectual bubble.""8 Given the underpinnings of the First
Amendment, these statements must be correct. If one of the core purposes of the
First Amendment is to prevent the government from using censorship to impose its
own political and moral values on the population, then entirely exempting children
from that protection would create a gaping hole in that purpose, since after all, most
people's values, beliefs, and world views are formed during childhood. Permitting
the State to completely control "the ethical and moral development" of minors
threatens to produce the worst kind of tyranny - a point made by Judge Posner
using the example of the Hitler Jugend during World War II. 9 In other words,
whatever the State's general power to protect children from harm, the kind of
ideological injury at issue in the indecency cases simply cannot qualify as a relevant
kind of "harm" when the issue is the nature of First Amendment limits on the
State's power to suppress speech. 10
The indecency problem, however, is not fully resolved by these principles
because, for better or for worse, the Court has quite clearly treated sexually explicit
proscription cannot be suppressed solely to protect the young from ideas or
images that a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them. In most circumstances,
the values protected by the First Amendment are no less applicable when
government seeks to control the flow of information to minors.
9 Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 2001)
(enjoining enforcement of municipal ordinance limiting minors' access to violent video
games); see also Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Webster, 968 F.2d 684, 689 (8th Cir.
1992) (rejecting a law aimed at protecting minors from "slasher" films); Cyberspace
Communications, Inc. v. Engler, 55 F. Supp. 2d 737, 749 (E.D. Mich. 1999), affd, 238 F.3d
420 (6th Cir. 2000) (recognizing the need for teens to discuss sexual issues - such as birth
control, abstinence, and rape - in an online forum).
99 Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 576-77.
0 My analysis here clearly draws a sharp distinction between the State's power to protect
children generally from harm even against the wishes of their parents - which is widely
acknowledged and which I do not question - and the State's power to protect children from
ideas, which I reject as violating the First Amendment. I acknowledge, however, that this
distinction may not always be an easy one to draw in situations where conduct becomes
intertwined with speech. Consider the example of a parent who supports his or her child's
desire to pose for sexually explicit pictures (suggested to me by Eugene Volokh in a
conversation). In these situations, as a realistic matter, the government's legitimate interest
in protecting a child from non-ideological harm should - and presumably will - trump any
First Amendment concerns. But in most cases, where the only state concern is minors'
exposure to inappropriate speech, the distinction remains a crucial one. Cf PSINet v.
Chapman, 167 F. Supp. 2d 878, 887 (W.D. Va. 2001) (failing to recognize the distinction
between government regulation of parental conduct, where the government may legislate
values even if contrary to parents' values, and government regulation of speech).
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speech differently from other speech in its First Amendmentjurisprudence.' Thus
even though, in general, the First Amendment almost certainly would be a bar to
efforts by the State to shield minors from "inappropriate" speech (e.g., communist
writings), it might not be a bar to such efforts directed at sexual speech. Indeed, in
the sexual speech context, even with respect to adults, there are limits to the anti-
orthodoxy rule, as demonstrated by the law of obscenity which permits the State to
suppress speech purely because of its disapproval.'12 Given this differential
treatment of sexual materials, it may be that the State possesses greater power to
shield children from sexually oriented ideas and images than other ideas and
images. Indeed, that seems to be the clear implication of recent cases striking down
state efforts to shield minors from violence while continuing to recognize the
State's power with respect to sexual materials.'03
One way to resolve this conundrum might be to argue that the Supreme Court
is simply wrong to treat sexuality differently from all other subjects of speech.
After all, why should this one topic be subject to vastly greater state regulation than
any other speech? One might argue, for example, that targeting sexual speech
alone, as the Court and much legislation has done, is underinclusive and violates
equality principles,0 4 especially given the lack of empirical evidence that sexual
speech harms minors. The Court has never given a clear answer to this criticism,
relying instead on precedent and a rather shaky reading of history to justify its
singling out of sexual speech, most notably in its decisions holding "obscenity" to
be unprotected speech.' Regardless, the disfavored treatment of sexual speech is
.0. See, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000) (nude dancing); Denver Area
Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996) (cable television
programming); City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (zoning of
adult theaters); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (child pornography); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity).
"02 See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Siaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973) (permitting legislatures to
ban obscene materials because they may conclude that "a sensitive, key relationship of human
existence, central to family life, community welfare, and the development of human
personality, can be debased and distorted by crass commercial exploitation of sex"). It should
be noted that some have argued that the main reason to regulate obscenity is offensiveness.
See, e.g., Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 574. That justification is clearly inadequate because current
law permits punishing the purely private viewing or sale of obscene materials. See Paris
Adult Theater , 413 U.S. at 57; United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971) (permitting
prosecution for mailing of obscene materials); cf Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)
(holding that purely private possession of obscene materials within one's own home may not
be prosecuted under the First Amendment).
103 See Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572; Webster, 968 F.2d at 689.
'04 Cf R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 387 (1992) (discussing
"underinclusiveness" but ultimately rejecting a law based on "content discrimination"); Carey
v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1980) (rejecting a law that prohibited all "nonlabor"
picketing).
105 See Roth, 354 U.S. at 482 & n.12 (concluding that obscenity may be barred because,
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probably too well established, both culturally and within the precedent, to be
challenged at this late date.
A better resolution of these issues might be found by examining the relative
roles of parents and the State in this area. In particular, it should be borne in mind
that when the State exercises control over the upbringing of a minor, particularly
by limiting her access to disfavored speech, two different sets of constitutional
principles, or rights, are implicated. First, of course, the State is directly interfering
with the child's access to speech. But in addition, the State also may be interfering
with the child's parents'power to have primary control over the child's moral and
intellectual development and upbringing. As noted earlier, this power, or right, has
been recognized by the Court to have constitutional dimensions."° The two leading
cases from the 1920s establishing this right each involved conflicts between parents
and the State over education. In Meyer, the Court struck down a statute forbidding
the teaching of foreign languages in schools, 7 and in Pierce, the Court invalidated
a law requiring parents to send their children to public schools. °8 Thus, both cases
involved speech, in a very real sense, and should be understood to rest on modem
First Amendment principles, as the Court has since recognized.' Meyer and
Pierce limit the State's power to suppress speech in the context of education, an
area where the State enjoys broad authority."0 Given the Court's limitation of
governmental power in those cases, it follows that the State may not censor purely
private speech in an effort to control children's upbringing. These cases suggest a
in 1792, all fourteen states "made either blasphemy or profanity, or both, statutory crimes").
Ignoring the problem of incorporation (i.e., that the First Amendment did not apply to the
states in 1792), one wonders if the Court would interpret this history to treat "blasphemy"
also as a disfavored form of speech.
106 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
o Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
108 Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
,o See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,482 (1965) (tracing holdings of Meyer and
Pierce to the First Amendment): Because these cases were decided during the Lochner era,
their doctrinal result was based on the Due Process Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment and
the 1920s Court's understanding of the concept of "ordered liberty," rather than the First
Amendment. Given the demise of the libertarian judicial ideology of that time, however, the
continued vitality of those cases (which no one seriously questions) must be defended by
reference to some narrower constitutional principle, and the First Amendment seems the
obvious candidate. Of course, since the 1920s, the right recognized in those cases has
evolved well beyond the confines of speech and education, and has become an aspect of the
unenumerated "privacy" right recognized in Griswold and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973). See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,65-66(2000) (plurality opinion) (recognizing
as fundamental the liberty interests of parents in the care, custody, and control of their
children). But the relationship between the First Amendment and the holdings in Meyer and
Pierce remains recognized, even by members of the Court who generally support an
unenumerated privacy right See id. at 95 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
110 See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 398.
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reconciliation of the anti-orthodoxy principle with the special status of children.
The anti-orthodoxy principle is based on the presumption that adult citizens are
competent and able to make their own judgments about political and moral issues,
and therefore the State simply may not suppress speech in an effort to influence
thosej udgments."' Obviously, the same assumptions about competence and ability
cannot be made about children, and so some control over children's access to
information and speech is inevitable. However, the power to control minors' access
to "unsuitable" speech, whether sexual or otherwise," 2 is given to parents, and it
remains true that the First Amendment prohibits the State from suppressing speech
in an effort to control children's "ethical and moral" development. In so far as the
Court has suggested otherwise in Ginsberg and subsequent cases, it is simply
wrong." 
3
The implications of these conclusions for the indecency cases seem fairly clear.
First, sexuality is an important component of education and human development,
and as such, state control over value development in that area raises serious First
Amendment concerns. Indeed, perhaps strangely, it is the very centrality of
sexuality to human values and experience that has led the Court to grant the State
greater regulatory leeway with respect to sexual speech."' For this same reason,
parental control over the development of children's attitudes and values in this area
is particularly important. Parental control is essential both to protect the parental
role and as an important restriction on the State's power to create and enforce an
orthodoxy on its future citizens - an objective which lies at the core of the First
Amendment's purposes. It should be noted in this regard that the existence of an
independent governmental interest in shielding children from indecency has
significance only when deployed to justify a regulation which acts contrary to, or
in the absence of, the expressed desires of parents. In other words, the real issues
.. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400.
,"2 See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
". One qualification is necessary here. It is obvious that the Court has treated "obscene"
speech, as narrowly defined in a sui generis fashion, see supra note 6 and accompanying text,
denying it all constitutional protection without any particular explanation. Insofar as
Ginsberg's holding is limited to obscene speech, even "obscene as to children," the holding
is not inconsistent with the broader body of the Court's jurisprudence, despite its internal
inconsistencies. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,634-36 (1968). However, later cases,
with little thought or discussion, have extended the reasoning in Ginsberg to merely
"indecent," nonobscene speech. That last move is inconsistent with broader principles, and
should be reconsidered.
"4 See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973) (describing sexual
materials as implicating "a sensitive, key relationship of human existence, central to family
life, community welfare, and the development ofhuman personality"); Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957) ("Sex, a great and mysterious motive force in human life, has
indisputably been a subject of absorbing interest to mankind through the ages; it is one of the
vital problems of human interest and public concern.").
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here are whether the government has the right to trump parental desires regarding
their children's access to sexually oriented speech, and whether the government has
a right to restrict speech in the face of parental inaction, which in turn might reflect
parental inertia or indifference.
On the first question - whether the government may trump parental
preferences - the above analysis clearly indicates that when there is a direct clash
between the government's views on what are "appropriate" materials for a minor
and the parent's own views, the parents views must prevail. In fact, the debate on
this issue has been remarkably muted because the government generally has shied
away from claiming such a power. Even the most vocal supporters (including the
government) of an independent state interest in protecting children from indecent
materials did not seriously dispute this point in Playboy, albeit no explanation was
given concerning how this concession is reconcilable with such an independent state
interest." 5 The Court has also studiously avoided addressing any potential conflict
between the two compelling interests it identified in Ginsberg."6 Insofar as the
issue has arisen (mainly in the lower courts), the almost-universal conclusion seems
to be that the governmental interest must yield to the parents' wishes."' The
reasons behind this consensus, however, seem to be instinctual rather than
analytical. And logically, under the Court's current analytical structure, the
possibility remains that under some circumstances the government might have the
power to deny minors access to speech, even if contrary to their parents' desires.
More broadly, however, the above discussion of the anti-orthodoxy principle
'1 See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 842 (2000) (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (describing independent governmental interest as in preventing young children
from "watching virulent pornography without parental consent") (emphasis added);
Appellants' Brief, Playboy (No. 98-1682), available at 1999 WL 700620, at *34-*35
(arguing that Section 505 does not prevent parents from exposing their children to indecent
materials, should they choose to do so); Transcript of Oral Argument, Playboy (No. 98-
1682), available at 1999 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 60, *1-*20 (arguing, as an attorney for the
United States, that Congress did not seek to trump parental desires, but only to limit
children's access to indecent materials without parental consent); see also Action for
Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (concluding that the
government's independent interest is in "shielding minors from being exposed to indecent
speech by persons other than a parent," and permitting parents to expose their children to
sexual materials if the parents so desire).
116 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,639-41 (1968) (recognizing the parental interest
in rearing their children and the State's interest protecting in the "well-being" of its minors).
117 See Fabulous Assocs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 896 F.2d 780, 788 (3d
Cir. 1990) (arguing that "[n]o constitutional principle is implicated" when parents choose to
provide their minors with access to dial-a-porn services); Actionfor Children's Television,
58 F.3d at 678 (Edwards, C.J., dissenting); id. at 686 (Wald, J., dissenting) (describing the
government's interest as "complementary" to parental interests); cf Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S.
844, 878 (1997) (suggesting that the governmental interest in protecting minors from
indecency must yield to parental wishes under some circumstances).
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strongly suggests that there is simply no independent governmental interest in
shielding children from indecent materials, even in the face of parental inaction.
The only basis for such an interest would have to be the government's purported
desire to control the "ethical and moral" development of the child, a point conceded
by proponents of such an interest."' But any such moral or ethical interest on the
part of the State directly contradicts the notion that the First Amendment prohibits
the State from promoting any sort of a political or ideological agenda through the
suppression of speech and that, with respect to children, any necessary c6ntrol over
access to speech is vested in parents, not the State.
This is not to say, however, that the State has no valid regulatory interests in
this area. As suggested above, the State's interest in facilitating parental control
over their children's exposure to speech actively advances the First Amendment
principles identified in Meyer and Pierce. "9 The State therefore remains free to act
in this area, but how it may act depends crucially on what interests it may pursue.
Given the lack of an independent governmental interest in advancing a moral
orthodoxy, it is crucial that when the State acts, it does so only to assist parents in
controlling their children's access to speech, and that the parents retain the decision-
making power as to which speech might be inappropriate.
..8 See Appellants' Brief, Playboy (No. 98-1682), available at 1999 WL 700620, at *31
n.22 ("Concerns about minors' exposure to [indecent] material are based on commonly held
moral views about the upbringing of children. .. ").
"9 See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (asserting the parental
right to direct their children's education and exposure to instruction); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 399-403 (1923) (declaring unconstitutional a law prohibiting the teaching of
any language other than English in school). It should be noted, moreover, that the parental
interest in controlling children's access to speech, and the State's interest in facilitating that
control, is in no way limited to sexual or indecent speech. As the Meyer and Pierce cases
indicate, parents have a constitutionally cognizable interest in exposing their children to
speech of which the State disapproves. Id. Additionally, as Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972), indicated, parents also have a cognizable interest in shielding their children from
speech ofwhich they disapprove. There seems no reason to doubt that the State may facilitate
parental decisions in this regard. Of course, if state facilitation efforts burden access to such
speech for those who do not disapprove of it, such efforts might nonetheless be
unconstitutional. Furthermore, one suspects that outside of the context of sexual speech, very
little burden on others would be permitted in the name of facilitation, because the
constitutional protection accorded such speech is likely to be extremely high since the speech
at issue is likely to be controversial for political reasons. Thus, in practice, the State is likely
to have little regulatory leeway, since almost all attempts at facilitation impose some burden
.on the regulated speech.
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III. A MODEL FOR ANALYZING THE GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN
PROTECTING CHILDREN
The above discussion indicates that there are two distinct policies driving
governmental regulation of sexually explicit speech. First, there is a relatively
uncontroversial governmental interest in facilitating the parental role in raising and
controlling their children, and in helping parents to inculcate their children with the
parents' values. Second, there may be an independent governmental interest in
creating a morally virtuous citizenry, which would potentially justify governmental
control over children's access to "immoral" materials, regardless of their parents'
wishes. There are strong arguments to be made that the latter interest, though
unquestionably driving much of the recent legislative activity against indecency, is
not legitimate, much less compelling, because it is inconsistent with the policies
underlying the First Amendment. 2 ' Ultimately, however, one's conclusions
regarding the validity of the independent governmental interest turn on one's views
of the State's proper role in a democratic society and on the fundamental purposes
of the First Amendment. Wide disagreement continues to exist on these issues, and
the courts themselves have not definitively rejected an independent governmental
interest (however far the Playboy majority may have moved in this direction).'2 1
The analysis below, therefore, will proceed by explaining both possibilities - that
an independent governmental interest does exists, and that such an interest does not
exist.
Whether there exists two distinct and compelling governmental interests in
regulating children's access to indecent materials has important implications for
governmental authority. The two interests interact with each other and with other
factors relevant to indecency regulation in complex ways. The balance of this
Article will explore the nature of those interactions and the implications this has for
various regulatory schemes, both actual and proposed.
A. A Matrix
The starting point for analysis must be to ask why it matters if the government
has an independent interest in regulating indecency. After all, it is universally
agreed that the State has a compelling interest in facilitating parental control over
children's access to sexual materials,' so why is that interest not sufficient to
120 See supra notes 106-18 and accompanying text.
'21 See supra note 61 and accompanying text; see also ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 173
(3d Cir. 2000), rev'don other grounds sub nom. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002)
(stating "[ilt is undisputed that the government has a compelling interest in protecting
children from material that is harmful to them, even if not obscene by adult standards").
122 See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
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justify government regulation? The answer lies in the potential tensions between
governmental and parental values regarding sexuality. The following matrix sets
forth one useful way to envision this point. It draws upon Justice Jackson's famous
analysis of executive authority in Youngstown Steel2' and analyzes governmental
power as a function of both the nature of the governmental interest in regulation and
of parental approval or disapproval of governmental policies:
Strength of Governmental Interest in Regulating Indecent Speech
Parents Share Parents Are Neutral/ Parents Oppose
Governmental Values Distracted Governmental Values
Independent Very strong govern- Strong governmental Weak or no govern-
State Interest mental interest in interest in regulating mental interest in
regulating indecency indecency regulating indecency
No Independent Strong governmental Governmental interest No legitimate govern-
State Interest interest in regulating in facilitating parental mental interest
indecency supervision only
As the first column of this matrix indicates, if all parents shared the
government's preferences and values regarding the ethics and morality of sexuality,
the existence of an independent governmental interest would be irrelevant because
a fortiori any governmental censorship advancing such an independent interest
would also directly advance the interest in facilitating parental control. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, the strongest judicial supporters of an independent governmental
interest have tended to sidestep the most problematic aspects of that interest by
assuming that all or the vast majority of (or all good?) parents share the State's
values in this area, and so the two interests work perfectly in tandem.124
What if, however, the assumption of perfect congruence of values was not
justified? What if there was some divergence between parental and governmental
values in this area? In that situation, the distinction between the two governmental
interests has important implications. Before exploring those implications, however,
it is worth examining how and why such a divergence between parents and the State
23 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,635-38 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (analyzing the independent executive authority as being strongest when Congress
authorizes the action, at its weakest when Congress disapproves of the action, and in a "zone
of twilight" when Congress is silent).
124 See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 843-45 (2000)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing as a "remote" possibility that fully informed parents
would not choose to block materials being censored by the challenged statute); Action for
Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (describing the two
governmental interests as "complementary," not in conflict).
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might occur.
At first glance, such a divergence seems odd - after all, what parent would
want her young children to view pornography?' 25 The difficulty is that "indecent"
materials are not limited to pornography. Under most definitions, any sexual speech
that is considered "patently offensive" under local community standards (as
understood by a jury) qualifies, 26 and unlike the definition of "obscenity," the
indecency standard does not require that the regulated speech "taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."'27 Most indecency
regulations prohibit communication of such materials to all minors, which covers
everything from two-year-olds to seventeen-year-olds' Under such a standard,
especially in conservative communities, many materials that are far from
pornography by any reasonable definition would be prohibited, even to teenagers.
As the Court noted in Reno v. ACLU, the indecency standard could cover
"discussions about prison rape or safe sexual practices, artistic images that include
nude subjects, and arguably the card catalogue of the Carnegie Library."' 29 The
broad statute at issue in Reno might have condemned "a parent who sent his 17-
year-old college freshman information on birth control via e-mail ... even though
neither he, his child, nor anyone in their home community, found the material
'indecent' or 'patently offensive,' if the college town's community thought
otherwise."'30 Indeed, in the Pacifica case, the Court upheld application of the
"indecency" standard as applied to the radio broadcast of a political satire because
it used "patently offensive" words.'3' Even in the Playboy case, which primarily
involved visual programming which fairly clearly qualified as pornography, there
were issues raised about the precise scope of the indecency standard.'32
The effect of the indecency standard, then, is to impose upon parents the views
and values of the local majority regarding what is appropriate fare for minors and
regarding the appropriate treatment of sexuality in the upbringing of children
through to adulthood. When these facts are taken into account, the possibility of
125 See Playboy, 529 U.S. at 842 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing "an 8-year-old
child ... watching virulent pornography").
126 See supra note I.
127 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
128 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870-71 (1997); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S.
726, 732 (1978); Action for Children's Television, 58 F.3d at 657.
129 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 878 (1997).
130 Id.
131 Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 745. Ironically enough, the satire - a monologue by
George Carlin - was targeted at, among other things, rules forbidding the broadcasting of
such "filthy words." Id. at 75 1.
132 Appellee's Brief, United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000)
(No. 98-1682), available at 1999 WL 756117, at *26-*29 (noting uncertainty about whether
challenged statute covered AIDS awareness programs).
698 [Vol. 11:671
PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM "INDECENT" SPEECH
conflicts between governmental (or majority) and parental values becomes quite
clear. There are broad moral differences both within this country and within local
communities regarding the appropriateness of sex education and the exposure of
minors to important but sexually tinged issues such as the AIDS epidemic or
prostitution, and more broadly regarding the moral implications of nudity and
sexuality. There may be few parents who would want their eight-year-old viewing
"virulent pornography,"' but what about Michelangelo's David? What about a
parent wishing to educate a fifteen-year-old about birth control and AIDS?
Moreover, there is another complication here: Parental preferences in this area
might not be limited to positive approval or disapproval of particular speech.
Instead, some parents might not take - or wish to take - active steps to expose
their minor children to sexually oriented materials, but might also not wish to shield
them from such materials, viewing casual exposure to sexuality as a natural part of
growing up (i.e., that it is normal to learn about sex "on the street"). In other words,
it might be that some parents consciously choose to be "indifferent" about their
children's exposure to sexually explicit materials. 34 In that situation, as with an
explicit difference in values between parents and the State, a conflict in preferences
is quite possible. A highly successful governmental censorship scheme might
substantially limit the possibility of minors being casually exposed to sexual speech
(though admittedly, a less successful regulatory program might well be consistent
with the desires of consciously indifferent parents).
With this background in mind, it is possible to examine the implications for
regulatory authority of a conflict between governmental and parental values.
Consider first the possibility that some or many parents might sharply disagree with
the State's value choices in this area and positively desire to expose minors to
sexually explicit materials (represented by the last column of the matrix).'35 Then,
one would face a direct conflict between the two governmental interests in
regulating indecency, because any effort to advance the government's independent
interest in shielding children would necessarily burden some parents' preferences
about their children's upbringing. In principle, there is no inherent reason why the
government's independent interest in shielding children might not trump parental
choices, and so the possibility of residual government regulatory power exists.36
In fact, however, few people today seem to argue this position, and thus in practice,
the courts probably would not permit an independent governmental interest in
shielding children from materials disapproved by the government to trump parental
113 See Playboy, 529 U.S. at 842 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (utilizing the phrase "virulent
pornography" in his analysis).
114 1 am grateful to Eric Spiegelman for this insight.
'3' See supra p. 697.
36 See Appellants' Brief, Playboy (No. 98-1682), available at 1999 WL 700620, at
*34-*3 5 (suggesting that parental interests might not prevail over the government's interest).
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preferences. 3' In this situation, as in the situation of complete convergence
between parental and governmental values, the existence of an independent
governmental interest would not matter a great deal. Without such an interest, the
government obviously has no interest in censoring indecent materials. But even if
such an interest existed, under current views it seems insufficient to justify
censorship of materials to which parents believe their children should be exposed.
B. Parental "Inertia, Indifference or Distraction"
That leaves the third possibility, the one generally emphasized by proponents
of regulation: Most parents neither fully approve of nor actively oppose
governmental policies, but rather they suffer from "inertia, indifference, or
distraction."'3 In this situation, represented by the middle column of the above
matrix,' the distinction between the two governmental interests is crucial. If the
government does have an independent interest in regulating indecency, then strong
regulations - including absolute bans on indecent speech accessible to children -.
are probably justifiable as the only effective way to advance the government's
interest in protecting children, given that parents cannot be counted upon to act on
their own. There is no conflict with parental desires, so there are no clashing
constitutional policies. If, on the other hand, the government does not have an
independent interest in controlling children's access to sexually explicit materials,
then governmental power is vastly reduced. The most that the government would
be justified in doing is helping parents overcome their inertia by reducing the
transactions costs of supervising their children - i.e., imposing regulatory
requirements which make it easier and less costly for parents to control their
children's access to sexual materials, without making it substantially more difficult
for minors whose parents do not oppose this to access particular speech.
That last point is critical. A positive bias for or against a particular outcome
with respect to minors' access to sexually explicit speech would not be justified
absent an independent governmental interest, since by hypothesis the government
must be neutral-as to the ultimate result unless it can assume a convergence of
values between itself and parents. Most modern regulation seems to be based on
such an assumption, to wit, that most or all parents fully agree with the State's
moral preferences in this area but lack the timeand will to implement their choices.
As discussed above, however, for many parents indifference might not reflect
'3' See, e.g., Fabulous Assocs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 896 F.2d 780,
788 (3d Cir. 1990) (asserting the parental discretion and ultimate authority in prohibiting
their children from accessing indecent materials).
138 This category is particularly important because, as I argue below, it probably includes
the vast majority of parents in this country. See infra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
' See supra p. 697.
700 [Vol. 11:671
PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM "INDECENT" SPEECH
inertia, but instead might reflect a laissez-faire choice with no positive desire to
expose minors to sexually explicit materials but also with no desire to shield
them. 40
Determining the dominant explanation is empirical in nature and is likely to
vary based on geography, parental values, and perhaps most importantly, the ages
of the children involved. The burden of proof on such issues normally would lie
with the government to justify censorship. It must be acknowledged, however, that
the issues at stake here are extremely complex and difficult to measure or prove.
For that reason, at times the State must be permitted to make reasonable judgments
if its regulatory authority is not to be denuded. On the other hand, there is an
obvious and pervasive risk that such judgments will be colored by the regulators'
own values and preferences - an impermissible result given the requirement of
neutrality. Thus, with respect to parents in the middle column, 4' constitutional
limits on the State's regulatory options are quite complex. In general, because of
the possibility of conflict with parental values and desires, it seems preferable that
the government be limited to regulatory options that facilitate parental preferences
rather than directly censor speech. If, however, there are strong, intuitive reasons
to believe that most parents are likely to share the State's disapproval of the speech
at issue and facilitation of parental control is not a real option, the government
retains the power to directly censor speech.
C. The Problem of Parental Diversity
One important refinement is necessary to the above analysis. As set forth, the
matrix assumes that all parents subject to particular regulation are the same - they
either share the government's values, oppose those values, or are neutral. 42 In
reality, that is obviously not the case. Ideological diversity is a fact of life in this
country and indeed is one of the basic reasons why we have a First Amendment in
the first place. Therefore, at any time, and given any particular set of state beliefs
as to what speech is suitable for children, some parents will fully share those views,
some will be indifferent or neutral towards the issue, and others will oppose the
State's views. The result ofthis ideological diversity is that no governmental policy
can perfectly advance the government's valid interests in this area.
The impossibility of perfectly advancing state interests is most obvious with
respect to the interest in facilitating parental control. Even flat censorship of speech
by the State facilitates parental control with respect to parents who fully share the
government's values; but, of course, such regulation directly contravenes the
facilitation interest for parents who disagree with the State and might also
0 See supra text accompanying note 139.
"4 See supra p. 697.
142 See supra p. 697.
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contravene the interests of "indifferent" parents.'43 Even non-censoring regulations
that merely "reduce transactions costs" - i.e., make it easier for parents to control
their children's access to sexual speech - and that thus seem to perfectly advance
the government's interest in facilitating parental control will not necessarily do so.
Any such regulation is likely to increase the cost of providing the regulated speech
and thus is likely to increase its price or reduce its availability. As a result, parents
who disagree with the government's values and want their children to be exposed
to the regulated speech will find it more difficult to do so. Therefore, such
regulation will inhibit and interfere with their ability to parent as they choose.
The difficulty in advancing the government's aims is less serious with respect
to the possible independent governmental interest in shielding children, since by
definition a policy of censorship advances the State's aims, regardless of the views
of parents. A problem does arise, however, because of the general agreement that
parental desires trump those of the State.'" With respect to parents who agree with
the government or truly suffer from inertia, there is of course no conflict; as such,
censorship directly advances the government's goals. But with respect to parents
who disagree with the State, and with those who are "consciously indifferent" to
their children's exposure to sexually explicit speech, such censorship is problematic
since it effectively trumps their preferences.
What implications does parental ideological diversity have for state regulatory
authority over "indecent" speech? This question is one of tailoring - how closely
must a regulatory policy align with the government's aims to pass constitutional
scrutiny? At a minimum, it seems clear that perfect alignment is not necessary even
under strict scrutiny - if it were, few regulations of speech would be possible. On
one reading of the doctrine in this area, seemingly championed by Justice Breyer
dissenting in Playboy, so long as there is no equally effective and significantly less
restrictive means of advancing the State's goals, the lack of alignment - or
alternatively, the burden placed on those not the target of the state policy - is
irrelevant.'45 Thus, if a regulatory policy advances the State's goal of facilitating
some parents' control over their children's upbringing, the effect on others'
preferences or speech is irrelevant. However, as Eugene Volokh has pointed out,
this reading of the strict scrutiny test seems too literal, because it places no limits
on the State's power to prohibit or limit speech in the name of pursuing a
"compelling" interest.'46 Such an application of the test is in clear conflict with
cases such as Butler v. Michigan, which held that the State may not "reduce the
143 See supra text accompanying note 139.
'44 See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
141 United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 840-41 (2000) (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
146 Volokh, supra note 15, at 165-67.
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adult population... to reading only what is fit for children."' Furthermore, since
any effort to "facilitate parental control" not only burdens speech but also inevitably
interferes with some parents' efforts to raise their children as they see fit, a
reasonably accurate understanding of parental views seems necessary for the
government to even argue that its regulations really do advance an interest in
facilitating parental control. If the State is permitted to advance an independent
interest in shielding children, then a less close fit might be permissible. But even
under those circumstances, if a regulation interferes with substantial numbers of
parents' preferences, then those preferences must trump those of the State; as such,
the degree of fit matters.
In practice, then, it matters a great deal how most people feel about indecent
speech in assessing regulatory power - the more accurately the State has gauged
parental views, the better the fit between any regulation and the State's interests,
especially when the interest is facilitation of parental control. If, for example, the
vast majority of parents shared the State's views about indecent speech and minors,
then even flat bans on indecent speech might be a permissible means of advancing
the State's interest in facilitating parental control. In that situation, there is no
doubt that censorship provides the most effective means of preventing minors from
accessing such materials.'48 Indeed, most regulations of indecent speech seem to
be based on a legislative assumption that all or most parents do agree with the
legislators' views about indecency and children, and the same assumption can be
found in judicial opinions supporting such regulations. 49 Like the question of why
some parents seem "indifferent" to their children's exposure to indecent speech, this
is of course an empirical issue, and one on which under strict scrutiny the State
bears the burden of proof. The answers to the questions, however, are extremely
complex and difficult to measure or prove. They also are susceptible to being
influenced by the decision-makers' preferences and biases. Therefore, caution is
in order, especially regarding claims that most parents fully share the government's
values. Indeed, even the government has hesitated to explicitly make such a claim;
rather, as typified by the Playboy litigation, the government's argument has tended
to be that parents suffer from "inertia, indifference, or distraction." 5 ° For this
'4' 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957); see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234,
252 (2002) ("The Government cannot ban speech fit for adults simply because it may fall
into the hands of children.").
148 As noted previously, see supra note 98, 1 am ignoring in this Article the burden that
such censorship also places on adult speech, which might provide an independent reason to
strike down such legislation, regardless of whether it is "narrowly tailored" to be the most
effective means to advance the State's goals.
'49 See Playboy, 529 U.S. at 842-43 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Action for Children's
Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
ISo Appellants' Brief, Playboy (No. 98-1682), available at 1999 WL 700620, at * 16-* 17,
*32-*35; Reply Brief, Playboy (No. 98-1682), available at 1999 WL 1021220, at * 12-* 13;
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reason, flat censorship cannot be understood to advance the government's interest
in facilitating parental control, and because of the possibility of conflict with
consciously indifferent or nonconformist parents, it may not even permissibly
advance an independent governmental interest.
At the other extreme, if most parents actively oppose the government's views
on indecent speech, then any governmental regulation of such speech is probably
not a permissible means of facilitating parental control, since such regulation will
undoubtedly interfere with those parents' preferences regarding their children. In
practice, however, this scenario is even less likely to be true than the possibility of
the vast majority of parents completely sharing the government's values. Indeed,
in a democratic form of government, it seems true almost by definition that a
majority of the population (or of parents, which seems to be a reasonably
representative subset of the general population) will not completely oppose the
views of the legislature regarding an important issue of public policy. As a practical
matter, it seems extremely unlikely that a large portion of parents in the United
States actively desire their children, even their teenagers, to have access to sexually
explicit speech.
In fact, the true state of affairs is likely to be a muddle: Most parents do not
zealously share the State's desires to shield minors from all indecent speech, but
neither do they actively desire exposure across the board. Rather, many - perhaps
most - parents are probably largely indifferent to the treatment of indecent speech
or, because of inertia, fail to actively supervise their children's access to such
speech (though as noted above, some substantial ambiguity remains about whether
this inertia or indifference is a product of apathy or of conscious choice'51). Many
other parents agree with the State or the community that some children should be
shielded from some indecent speech (e.g., young children and "virulent
pornography") but disagree that all children should be shielded from all indecent
speech (e.g., teenagers and information about AIDS or birth control).
In this situation, regulatory efforts to reduce the difficulty and costs of parents
exercising control seem permissible, because such efforts tend to maximize parental
flexibility. Whereas any such efforts will inevitably interfere to some extent with
some parents (notably parents whose values are highly opposed to the majority's),
the interference is likely to be fairly limited and therefore not sufficiently
substantial to raise constitutional concerns.5 2 On the other hand, active suppression
see also Playboy, 529 U.S. at 842-43 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing parental
indifference); Action for Children's Television, 58 F.3d at 661 (stating that most parents are
unable to effectively supervise their children's television viewing).
's' See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
152 Some balancing, of course, is inevitable here, since as noted earlier, no regulatory
policy can perfectly advance the State's interests in this area while imposing no collateral
burdens. But it seems fairly clear that the balance cuts in favor of regulations purely
facilitating parental control.
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of merely indecent speech by the State seems clearly impermissible as a means of
facilitating parental control, since such efforts inevitably will conflict with the
desires of many parents. Because of the existence of diversity among parents and
the availability of regulatory alternatives that reduce the barriers to parental control,
actual suppression of speech in the name of facilitating parental control should be
permitted only if: (1) almost all parents would agree that the suppressed speech is
inappropriate for minors (a condition which might be satisfied with respect to the
most graphic pornography but is not likely to hold for much else); and (2) the State
cannot effectively enhance parental control over their children's access to such
materials. This presumably is a rare combination. 3
Finally, it should be noted that if there really is an independent state interest in
shielding children from indecent speech, then the argument in favor of more
aggressive regulation that actually suppresses indecent speech becomes much
stronger. This is true most obviously because censorship provides the most direct
means of advancing such an interest. In addition, it is highly doubtful that such
censorship would interfere with a substantial number of parents who actively wish
to expose their children to particular "indecent" speech, so long as a regulation does
not completely ban particular forms of speech and so retains some avenues for
parents to circumvent regulatory limits."3 4 Therefore, the problem of "trumping"
parental preferences might not bar such regulation. Ultimately, the permissibility
of such regulation would turn on a case-by-case analysis of the types of speech
suppressed by the regulation and the degree to which parents share or oppose the
government's objectives.
In short, in the real world of ideological diversity and parental inertia and
indifference, it matters a great deal in analyzing regulations of indecent speech
whether the State has an independent interest in shielding children from such
speech, in addition to its undoubted interest in facilitating parental desires in this
regard. It is of course the premise of this Article that, for all of the reasons
'3 In addition to these other barriers, a censorship scheme would also need to clearly
define the prohibited materials in terms that exclude materials upon which parents disagree.
It is not at all clear how such a definition would be stated, suggesting that the need to create
a clear definition of "graphic pornography," for example, poses a substantial - and perhaps
insurmountable - barrier to such a regulatory scheme.
s See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,639 (1968) ("[T]he prohibition against sales
to minors does not bar parents who so desire from purchasing the magazines for their
children."); Action for Children's Television, 58 F.3d at 663 ("Today, ofcourse, parents who
wish to expose their children to the most graphic depictions of sexual acts will have no
difficulty in doing so through the use of subscription and pay-per-view cable channels,
delayed-access viewing using VCR equipment, andthe rental or purchase of readily available
audio and video cassettes."); cf Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 865 (1997) (noting that one
problematic aspect of the CDA was that "neither the parents' consent - nor their
participation - in the communication would avoid the application of the statute").
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discussed earlier,' no such independent interest exists. It follows from this
conclusion (though not as directly as one might presume) that the best governmental
regulations of indecent speech generally are those that facilitate parental control
over their children by lowering the barriers to and costs of such control. Direct
suppression of indecent speech is permissible only if such facilitating measures are
not practical and there is strong reason to believe that most parents share the
government's views regarding the harmful effects of the censored speech.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR CURRENT REGULATIONS
This Part of the Article examines the implications of the above analysis and
conclusions for a variety of specific regulatory schemes that have been proposed or
enacted in recent years. The analysis will proceed by examining various different
electronic communications media because the nature of regulatory schemes has
tended to depend sharply on the medium being enforced, and the practical impact
of particular regulation also has tended to depend significantly on the nature of the
communications medium.'"
A. Broadcast Regulation
Broadcast radio and television is the oldest form of electronic mass media. It
is also the most heavily regulated, as a result of an extensive and intrusive
regulatory scheme set forth in the Communications Act of 1934' and a series of
Supreme Court decisions holding that broadcasters may constitutionally be subject
to extensive, even content-based regulation.'58 On the subject of indecent speech,
radio broadcasters are prohibited statutorily from broadcasting any "obscene,
indecent, or profane language."' 59 In Pacifica Foundation, the Court held that the
FCC may bar the transmission of indecent or offensive language during daytime
hours, when children are likely to be exposed to it."6 Relying on this holding, the
SSee supra Part 11.
I6 1 do not discuss the print media simply because there is little continuing debate in this*
area. In Ginsberg, the Court held that the State may ban the sale of sexually explicit materials
to minors (though in Ginsberg, the actual ban was on materials obscene as to minors, not
indecent materials). Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 631 n.I. In Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380
(1957), however, the Court struck down an absolute ban on the sale of indecent materials.
This area of the law seems well established and is largely uncontroversial at present.
'17 47 U.S.C. §§ 1-1110 (2000). The Communications Act amended and expanded upon
a regulatory regime first established in 1927.
' See, e.g., CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726
(1978); Red Lion Broad, Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
'19 18 U.S.C. § 1454 (2000).
"6 Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 748-51; id. at 760-61 (Powell, J., concurring in part and
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D.C. Circuit in ACTIII, decided in 1995, upheld a congressional statute and FCC
regulations banning the broadcast of indecent materials over radio or television
during daytime hours, finding that such a rule was narrowly tailored to advance the
State's dual compelling interests in facilitating parental supervision and shielding
children from indecent materials. 6 ' Thus, under current law, broadcasting of
indecent materials is strictly limited to nighttime hours, which are defined as
between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m.
Is the use of "time-channeling" rules to restrict indecent speech in broadcasting
consistent with the analysis developed here? To begin with, it is obvious that time-
channeling rules seem designed more to advance an independent government
interest in shielding children rather than an interest in facilitating parental control,
because they do not directly advance parental control in any way. As such, the rules
seem problematic if no such independent interest exists. However, there is a
difficulty in relation to broadcasting in that, at least until recently, there was no
simple way for the government to directly assist parents in controlling their
children's viewing. Certainly in 1978, and probably also in 1995, television and
radio broadcasts simply entered the home and were picked up by receivers - no
filtering technology was available. As a result, the only way for parents to directly
control their children's access was to insist on being present when a radio or
television program was being broadcasted - an option which, while perhaps
desirable, is not terribly practical (and in any event is far beyond the power of the
State to impose), especially in an era when many minors are at home alone in the
afternoon. In that context, some form of time-channeling might well have
constituted a narrowly tailored means of facilitating parental control, since it
assisted parents in exercising supervision over their children's viewing (and
listening) habits, albeit while also imposing burdens on adult access to speech and
on parents who disagreed with the State's policies on child rearing.
Arguably, however, a policy restricting indecent speech to late-night hours
(after 10 p.m., or after midnight under the original legislation)'62 is not well tailored
to the purpose of facilitating parental control. The biggest barriers to parental
supervision clearly exist during afternoon work hours, when many minors watch
television entirely unsupervised; therefore, a ban on indecent speech during that
time seems well targeted to facilitating parental control. During evening hours,
parents generally are present, although many may not choose to closely supervise
their children's viewing habits. Barring indecent speech during those hours thus
does not truly facilitate parental supervision; it merely advances the government's
purported- but arguably illegitimate - desire to shield children regardless of their
parents' desires. Perhaps one might seek to justify an evening ban based on an
concurring in the judgment).
'61 Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 659-67 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
162 See id. at 656.
20031
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
assumption that parents wish to prohibit all access to controversial materials but,
because of inertia or distraction, fail to do so. As noted earlier, however, such an
assumption is empirically unjustified, and therefore, absent an independent
compelling interest in shielding children, a ban on the evening broadcast of indecent
speech seems overly broad. This is not to say that the State can take no steps to
assist parental supervision during the evening, but such steps must in fact be
designed to facilitate parental control, not merely to ban speech that the State
dislikes. For example, provisions requiring broadcasters to disclose and publicize
when they will transmit indecent programming might well be defensible as a means
of facilitating supervision, but the ultimate decision as to whether access to certain
programming should be barred must be left to parents. An absolute ban would not
allow this.
Since 1995, the debate over indecency in broadcasting has been complicated by
the availability of new "V-chip" technology, which permits greater parental filtering
of television broadcasts. In 1996, Congress passed legislation requiring essentially
all new televisions to contain such technology.163 The legislation requiring
incorporation of V-chip technology seems perfectly suited to the State's goal of
facilitating parental control and thus would appear to easily satisfy the
constitutional analysis set forth here, so long as the costs of implementing the
regulations are not exorbitant (which they do not appear to be). Furthermore, it
would seem that the State would also be justified in imposing a mandatory rating
system on broadcasters (and other television programmers as well, since the V-chip
also filters cable television programming), as a means of facilitating parental
control.'64 Both the V-chip requirement and a rating system increase parental
control while imposing minimal restrictions on speech, and as such, seem to be
extremely well aligned with the State's interest in facilitating parental supervision
The question that remains is whether the availability of such filtering
technology, which would appear to fully and directly advance the State's interest
in assisting parents, has the consequence of making time-channeling rules
163 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 303(x), 330(c) (2000). See generally J.M. Balkin, Media Filters, the
V-Chip, and the Foundations of Broadcast Regulation, 45 DUKE L.J. 1131 (1996)
(discussing media filtering in general, and the V-Chip in particular); Steven D. Feldman, The
V-Chip: Protecting Children from Violence or Doing Violence to the Constitution?, 39 How.
L.J. 587 (1996) (giving an overview of V-Chip technology and legislation).
' In fact, the same legislation which required use ofthe V-chip also invited the television
industry to establish a ratings system (and a system of transmitting ratings with
programming), with the threat that if the industry failed to do this, the FCC would step in.
The industry did eventually adopt such a ratings system, which was approved by the FCC and
has been in place since 1998. See F.C.C., Implementation of Section 551 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996: Video Programming Ratings, CS Docket No. 97-55, FCC
98-35 (Mar. 13, 1998), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Cable/Orders/1998/
fcc98035.html.
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unnecessary and therefore unconstitutional. At first glance, that would appear to
be the case, because if the V-chip permits full parental control (without even
requiring their actual presence), then further measures that block speech would
seem unnecessary.
Some objections might, however, be raised to such a conclusion. First, not all
parents will use the V-chip technology. Second, not all televisions contain V-chips
at this point in time. Finally, not all television viewing by children occurs at home.
The first is not a legitimate objection. For the reasons noted above, the State has
no basis for presuming that parents who do not employ the V-chip are doing so
because of inertia, rather than conscious choice (or disagreement with the State's
definition of what is inappropriate for minors). At most, the State would be
justified in publicizing the availability of filtering technology - and requiring that
it be easy to use - to overcome inertia. But if parents make a conscious choice not
to filter, the State is powerless. The second objection is more serious, because it is
true that many older televisions, which do not contain the filtering technology,
remain in use. This suggests that the current time-channeling rules might remain
necessary, 6 ' but that they should be phased out as new televisions containing filters
replace the existing stock. The final objection is the most problematic, because it
raises the possibility that even if parents wish to - and do - utilize filtering
technology, their children might be exposed to "indecent" speech at the homes of
friends, for example, whose parents do not share the same values or zeal. It should
be noted, however, that if V-chips were universally available, deployed, and
understood, the danger of casual access is reduced substantially, making the task
of parental supervision somewhat easier. But this is not a complete answer to the
problem. If the State were able to demonstrate that exposure to indecent
programming outside the home posed a significant problem for parental control, and
that there was no solution to this problem beyond time-channeling, then the State
might well be able to demonstrate that time-channeling rules were indeed narrowly
tailored to advance its legitimate and compelling interests (at least as to
programming that most parents would agree was inappropriate for most children).
Of course, the question would still remain as to whether such rules impose too great
of a burden on adult speech when compared to the magnitude of the problem being
addressed, but that is an issue beyond the scope of this Article.'
Though for the reasons noted above, such channeling requirements should probably
be limited to work hours.
"6 On this subject, see Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 131-32
(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); Eugene Volokh, supra note 15, at 165-67; supra note 98 and
accompanying text.
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B. Telephony and "Dial-a-Porn "
Another area in which the regulation of "indecent" speech for the purpose of.
protecting children has clashed with First Amendment principles in recent years is
indecent telephone messages and, in particular, commercial "dial-a-porn"
services. 167 The first congressional and administrative attempts to regulate such
services began in 1983 and generated an extended series of administrative
challenges and remands, the exact details of which are not important here.'68 In
1988, Congress passed a statute flatly banning all ihterstate commercial telephone
messages that were either obscene or indecent, 69 and in 1989, in Sable
Communications,7 ' the Supreme Court struck down this statute (as applied to
indecent messages) on the grounds that the statute was not narrowly tailored
because it restricted too much adult speech in the name of shielding children. 7'
Later that year, in response to Sable, Congress quickly passed the "Helms
Amendment," which prohibits making "any indecent communication for
commercial purposes which is available to any person under 18 years of age or to
any other person without that person's consent."'7 The statute also established a
safe harbor protecting telephone companies who provide billing for dial-a-porn
services from liability if they establish "reverse blocking" procedures, whereby only
customers who request access in writing to dial-a-porn services will be able to
access such services. 173 The statute also authorized the FCC to establish regulatory
safe harbors for dial-a-porn providers themselves. 74  The FCC then passed
regulations establishing a safe harbor for such providers so long as they notify
telephone companies that they provide sexually oriented messages and either
require that: (1) customers pay with credit cards; (2) customers obtain an access
code prior to using the service; or (3) customers use a previously obtained
descrambler to unscramble their messages. 175 In two separate decisions, the Ninth
and Second Circuits upheld the Helms Amendment and its implementing
regulations as consistent with the First Amendment, because they were narrowly
67 Dial-a-porn services are oral communications of a sexual nature, often prerecorded,
provided over telephone lines for a charge.
68 The regulatory actions and legal challenges are described in detail in Dial Info. Servs.
Corp. v. Thornburgh, 938 F.2d 1535, 1537 (2d Cir. 1991). See Fabulous Assocs., Inc. v.
Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 896 F.2d 780 (3d Cir. 1990) (invalidating a state law
regulating dial-a-por services).
169 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) (2000) (as amended).
170 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
171 Id.
172 47 U.S.C. § 223(b)(2)(A) (2000).
171 Id. § 223(c)(1).
14 Id. § 223(c)(3).
"1 47 C.F.R. § 64.201 (2003).
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tailored to advance the government's compelling interest in shielding children from
indecent speech.'76 Crucial to both of these rulings was the courts' rejection of the
argument that the new rules were not narrowly tailored because another regulatory
option called "voluntary blocking" - a system whereby telephone subscribers, free
of charge, may request that their telephone be blocked from access to sexually
explicit services - would provide a less restrictive means for achieving the
government's goal.' The courts rejected voluntary blocking because it was less
effective in achieving the government's goals for two different reasons. 7 First,
there were substantial doubts about the actual effectiveness of such schemes,
especially in their ability to block long-distance dial-a-porn calls.' But second,
both courts also relied on the argument that voluntary blocking is ineffective
because, due to ignorance, many parents will not take advantage of it, at least until
they discover that their children have accessed dial-a-porn services.' 0
It is no longer seriously disputed that a flat ban on interstate indecent telephone
messages of the sort struck down in Sable is unconstitutional. The analysis
developed here contributes little in that respect, since the problem identified in
Sable was the burden on adult speech imposed by such a bar (though it should be
noted that the burden on adult speech was fatal only because an effective regulatory
option which facilitated parental control was available to the government).'' The
successor rules upheld by the Second and Ninth Circuits, however, raise much more
interesting questions than a flat ban. In effect, those rules prohibit granting minors
access to dial-a-porn unless a parent prearranges such access either by requesting
in writing that reverse blocking be lifted (if the telephone company bills for the
services) or presubscribing to the services. Unlike a flat ban on dial-a-porn, these
rules do not entirely displace parents' judgments with the State's regarding
children's access to such services. As such, they are clearly defensible as a means
of facilitating parental control.
These rules do, however, shift the presumption with respect to inactive parents,
176 Dial Info. Servs. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 938 F.2d 1535, 1537 (2d Cir. 1991); Info.
Providers' Coalition for Def. of the First Amendment v. FCC, 928 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1991).
'" Dial Info. Servs. Corp., 938 F.2d at 1541-43; Info. Providers'Coalition, 928 F.2d at
872-74.
178 Dial Info. Servs. Corp., 938 F.2d at 1541-43; Info. Providers'Coalition, 928 F.2d at
872-74.
171 Info. Providers' Coalition, 928 F.2d at 873.
"o Dial Info. Servs. Corp., 938 F.2d at 1542; Info. Providers'Coalition, 928 F.2d at 873.
The Second Circuit relied heavily on this argument, noting that over the preceding two years,
"only four percent of the 4.6 million residential telephone lines in the area having access to
[dial-a-porn services] have been blocked" and, according to a study, "half of the residential
households in New York are not aware of either the availability of dial-a-porn or of
blocking." Dial Info. Servs. Corp., 938 F.2d at 1542.
0. Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128 (1989).
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from a presumption of children having access to sexual speech absent supervision,
to a presumption of children not having access. Such a shift in presumption, of
course, is entirely defensible if the State has an independent interest in shielding
children from indecency, which must yield only to actively stated parental
preferences. If such an independent interest does not exist, however, the shift in
presumption becomes somewhat more problematic, especially in its effect on
parents who are "consciously indifferent" to their children's activities inthis regard.
On the other hand, the shift might be defended as a reasonable means for the State
to assist parents who suffer from ignorance or inertia, but who actually prefer that
their children, of any age, be unable to access such services, if the State may assume
that the latter group predominates. The predominance of parents who share the
State's hostility to dial-a-por is, of course, an empirical question, but this may be
an area in which the State is permitted to rely on the assumption that parents who
share the State's hostility to dial-a-porn are far more common than "consciously
indifferent" parents. This is because as a matter of common sense, the assumption
seems reasonable, but the burden of proving such predominance seems almost
insurmountable. 2 Additionally, the Helms Amendment imposes relatively minor
burdens on both adult speech and on parents who positively desire their children to
have access to such speech, since credit card payment is one option provided in the
regulatory safe harbor reducing the cost to those who do not share the State's
hostility.'83
Furthermore, the "voluntary blocking" option advocated by the dial-a-porn
providers does not really provide an alternate means for the State to assist parents,
for two reasons. First, "voluntary blocking," as currently implemented, simply
seems to be ineffective, since it cannot block all dial-a-porn services." 4 Second,
there are enormous information cost barriers to successfully informing all telephone
subscribers (i.e., essentially all households) of the existence of dial-a-por services
and the availability of blocking. Of course, the existence of such costs does not
necessarily condemn a voluntary blocking scheme (such an argument was, for
example, rejected by the Court in Playboy).' But in light of the minimal burden
on speech imposed by the current rules, it seems unnecessary to impose such costs
on either the State or the telephone industry (who presumably would bear the costs,
not dial-a-porn providers themselves). The regulatory scheme upheld by the Ninth
.82 It should be remembered in this regard that dial-a-por services are commercial - and
therefore potentially expensive - and that unlike cable programming and the Internet, with
dial-a-porn services, the "indecent speech" at issue has little or no social or educative value.
183 See supra text accompanying note 175.
184 Info. Providers' Coalition, 928 F.2d at 873. It should be noted, though, that if
technological advances permitted an effective voluntary blocking system to be developed,
an argument might be made that the current rules are overbroad, though the rules still might
be defended because of the information-cost problems discussed in the text.
... United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 824 (2000).
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and Second Circuits therefore appears to constitute a reasonable attempt to
accommodate and assist parents who are unable to supervise their children because
of ignorance or other barriers, and thus passes constitutional scrutiny, even under
the analysis set forth in this Article.
C. Cable Television Regulation
Whereas the broadcasting and telephone industries undoubtedly have been the
target of some important regulatory efforts to suppress indecent speech over the
years, there is no doubt that the most prominent and significant such attempts in
recent years have focused on the relatively new technologies of cable television and
the Internet. Because it is older and (for now) more pervasive, cable television in
particular has been the target of a number of regulatory initiatives over the past two
decades," 6 which have produced two significant Supreme Court cases since the
mid-I 990s: Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC"7
and United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group.'88 In Playboy, the Court struck
down Section 505 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which required cable
operators to either "fully scramble" or limit to nighttime hours the transmission of
channels "primarily dedicated to sexually-oriented programming" because of
concerns that partial scrambling of the type normally employed exposed children
via "signal bleed" to fleeting images of a sexual nature.'89 In Denver Area, the
Court (in a highly splintered opinion) upheld in part and struck down in part
congressional efforts to regulate indecent programming on leased access and public
access channels.9' The Court upheld one provision, Section 10(a) of the Cable
Television and Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992,' which
permitted cable television operators to prohibit the transmission of indecent
programming on leased access channels, but it struck down two other portions of
186 See, e.g., Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986) (per curium) (striking
down a Utah statute treating as a nuisance the transmission over cable facilities of "indecent
material"), aff'd, 480 U.S. 926 (1987); Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415 (1 1th Cir. 1985)
(striking down a Miami ordinance prohibiting "obscene or indecent" materials from being
distributed over cable television facilities); Altmann v. Television Signal Corp., 849 F. Supp.
1335 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (striking down Sections 10(a) and (c) of the Cable Television and
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, later at issue in the Supreme Court's
Denver Area decision).
187 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
... 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
'189 47 U.S.C. § 561 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). The holding of the Playboy case is described
in detail supra, and will not be reiterated here. See supra notes 45-60 and accompanying
text.
190 For a description of such channels, see supra note 3 1.
,91 47 U.S.C. § 532(h) (1994).
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the same Act, Sections 10(b) and 10(c)." Section 10(b) required cable operators
to "segregate" all indecent materials on leased access channels onto a separate
channel, and then to implement a "reverse blocking" scheme whereby that channel
would be available only to subscribers who request access in writing. 93 Section
10(c), on the other hand, paralleled Section 10(a) in giving cable operators
discretion to ban indecent programming on public access channels. 4 The Court (or
more accurately, a plurality), however, concluded that because of historical
differences between leased and public access, this discretion was
unconstitutional. 95
What does a sustained analysis of the nature of the governmental interests in
regulating indecency contribute to our understanding of the issues raised in Playboy
and Denver? With respect to Playboy, the analysis appears to fully support the
result reached by the Court. 6 This is unsurprising since, as discussed earlier, the
Playboy majority, in striking down Section 505, seems to have relied - albeit
ambiguously and with little analysis - on the lack of an independent governmental
interest in "protecting" children from indecent speech. In reaching that result, the
Court reasoned that the voluntary blocking option offered by Section 504 of the
same Act fully protected the governmental interest in assisting parents.' A
counter-argument might be made here that Section 505's time-channeling
requirement is a justifiable method of facilitating parental control because of the
high costs of informing parents about Section 504's voluntary blocking option, and
because most parents share the State's aversion to "signal bleed." In fact, however,
both of the key underlying assumptions of this argument seem weak. It does not
seem especially difficult to inform cable subscribers about a generally available,
voluntary blocking option (an insert in cable bills might well suffice). It also seems
a stretch to believe that many or most parents are truly concerned about their
children's exposure to the fleeting images resulting from signal bleed. This is
undoubtedly why the government and the Playboy dissent relied so heavily on the
independent interest in defending Section 505.' Without that interest, however,
the defense of Section 505 becomes weak indeed.
Unlike with Playboy, focusing attention on the nature of the governmental
interests at stake in the Denver Area case yields surprising results. Focusing on
Sections 10(a) and 10(c), which granted cable operators discretion to ban indecent
speech (but, it should be noted, no other speech) from leased and public access
192 Id §§ 532(i), (i).
193 Id. § 5320).
194 Id. § 531.
'9' Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 760-63
(1996).
196 United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 825-26 (2000).
d197 I .
'9 See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
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channels, the argument for constitutionality is extremely weak (contrary to the
Court's conclusion upholding Section 10(a)).' 99 A law that grants standardless
discretion to cable companies - purely private actors - to ban indecent speech
does absolutely nothing to advance the government's interest in facilitating parental
control over their children's upbringing, because the ultimate decision on whether
to limit indecency lies not with individual parents but with a single, unaccountable
third party. Thus, absent an independent governmental interest in shielding
children, Sections 10(a) and 10(c) do not appear even rationally related, much less
narrowly tailored to advance the government's interest, and should have been struck
down.20
The analysis with respect to Section 10(b) is even more interesting. The Court
held that this provision, by requiring cable operators to segregate indecent speech
on leased access channels and then to block those channels, imposed an excessive
burden on speech." 1 A strong argument can be made, however, that a segregation
requirement is in fact an entirely defensible means forthe State to facilitate parental
control over their children's viewing. One of the great burdens parents face in
supervising their children's viewing is the sheer volume of cable programming,
which is far greater than broadcast television programming and beyond the capacity
of most people to track. This volume makes it difficult or impossible for parents to
effectively employ filtering mechanisms, such as lockboxes, or to supervise their
children by keeping track of when indecent material might be available (unless, of
course, parents were to be present whenever children watched television - an
unlikely prospect under modem conditions). Segregation requirements respond to
this need by moving indecent programming to a few, identifiable channels which
parents can track and, if they wish, block. As such, a segregation requirement
seems ideally suited to facilitating parental control by reducing information and
other transaction costs without imposing direct state censorship. Thus, the Denver
Area Court seems to have been dead wrong in questioning the utility and
permissibility of segregation requirements as a means to advance the governmental
interests at stake in indecency cases.
Of course, in addition to the segregation requirement, Section 10(b) also
imposed a "reverse blocking" requirement on segregated channels,0 2 and the Court
was on stronger grounds in invalidating this provision. As the Court discussed in
Denver Area, reverse blocking schemes put substantial burdens on speech by
1 Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 737-53.
200 Indeed, granting cable operators discretion to suppress indecent speech seems a rather
indirect way of advancing the government's own purported interest in shielding children,
since under that provision the decision on whether such speech continues to be transmitted
lies not with the State, but with local cable operators.
20' Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 753-60.
202 47 U.S.C. § 5320) (1994).
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making it impossible for viewers to watch particular speech without unblocking
well in advance (up to 30 days, in this instance).0 3 Furthermore, such a requirement
advances the state interest in assisting parents far less directly than alternative
regulatory mechanisms, such as voluntary blocking upon customer request (which
is also required by federal law under Section 504 of the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, cited in the Playboy case2") and the use of "lockbox" mechanisms, which
permit subscribers to block particular channels or programs. 5 The primary
rationale for reverse-blocking appears to be the same "parental inertia and
ignorance" as advanced in Playboy and in the context of dial-a-porn regulation.2 6
As the Playboy Court noted, however, the obvious response to such ignorance or
inertia does not appear to be blocking; it appears to be providing information to
parents and requiring cable operators to increase the availability and ease of use of
blocking and filtering mechanisms.2 7 After all, unlike the situation presented by
dial-a-porn, parents who subscribe to cable television are surely aware of the
possibility that "indecent" programming might exist on cable. Such rules, combined
perhaps with segregation requirements and mandatory ratings (again designed to
ease parents' information costs) seem likely to successfully permit parents to filter
programs they find inappropriate, without imposing a uniform, state-set standard of
indecency, and without trampling on the wishes of parents who disagree with the
State or who are consciously indifferent to their children's access to sexual speech.
Finally, it must be noted that with the advent of V-chip technology,20 8 much of
the above discussion might become moot. As with broadcast television, the full
implementation and widespread availability of V-chips, along with implementation
of a rating system permitting use of the technology, might well eliminate the need
for any other filtering mechanism, including segregation requirements and
lockboxes (though not, of course, ratings requirements). If and when this
technology becomes ubiquitous, the scope of permissible governmental regulation
in this area will decline dramatically for all of the reasons discussed in the context
of broadcast regulation.
In conclusion, in the context of cable television, the availability of filtering
mechanisms and the relatively lower information costs faced by parents (especially
with governmental assistance in obtaining information) suggest that the State's
regulatory power over indecent speech in this area depends crucially on the nature
of the governmental interest at stake. If the government does indeed have an
203 Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 755-58.
204 47 U.S.C. § 560 (1994 & Supp. Il 1997).
205 Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 758-59..
206 Id at 758-59 (quoting the government's brief, which set forth barriers to parental use
of lockboxes).
207 United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 825-26 (2000).
208 See supra notes 162-66 and accompanying text.
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independent interest in shielding children from sexual speech, fairly draconian
regulations might well be defensible as the only effective means of preventing
children from accessing disfavored speech. If, however, no such interest exists, as
argued in this Article, and the government's only legitimate interest is in assisting
parents in shielding their children from speech which theparents find inappropriate,
then the scope of permissible governmental regulation is limited to those steps
which enable parents to employ the available filtering technology by reducing
information costs and easing access to such technology. Of course, as discussed in
the context of broadcasting regulation, no filtering technology can protect perfectly
against exposure to indecent materials. Even powerful filters, such as the V-chip,
cannot protect against exposure outside the home. Short of an absolute ban on
indecent speech, however, no regulatory scheme can provide such absolute
protection (and in truth, even an absolute ban will not be completely effective).
Filters, especially filters that are widely available and easy to use, promise to
achieve much of the goal of facilitating parental supervision of their children
without imposing a state-sponsored orthodoxy and, as such, should remain the
favored means of regulation in this area.
D. Regulation of the Internet
As with cable television, the Internet in recent years has provided many
examples of regulatory attacks on indecent speech that have run up against the
strictures of the First Amendment. The lower federal courts have dealt with a
number of state efforts to restrict "indecent" speech on the Intemet,2" and federal
regulation in this area already has generated two major Supreme Court decisions.21
Many of the debates surrounding regulation of indecency on the Internet parallel
those regarding cable television, especially regarding the availability and efficacy
of filtering as a preferred method of regulation. But there also are important factual
" See ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 1999) (striking down aNew Mexico
statute prohibiting the dissemination by computer of materials harmful to minors); PSINet
v. Chapman, 167 F. Supp. 2d 878 (W.D. Va. 2001) (striking down a Virginia law that
prohibited displaying to minors any materials, including electronic files that contain sexually
explicit materials); Cyberspace Communications v. Engler, 142 F. Supp. 2d 827 (E.D. Mich.
2001) (striking down a Michigan statute prohibiting the transmission of sexually explicit
material to minors over the Internet); Am. Libraries v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (striking down a New York statute prohibiting transmission by computer of sexual
materials to minors).
0 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002) (holding that the Child Online Protection
Act's definition of what was harmful to minors did not render the Act unconstitutionally
overbroad); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (striking down the CDA's "indecent
transmission" and "patently offensive display" provisions as violations of the First
Amendment).
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and technological differences which complicate the issues tremendously.
The most prominent recent example of a regulation aimed at indecency on the
Internet was undoubtedly the Communications Decency Act ("CDA"), which was
struck down by the Supreme Court in Reno v. ACLU.2 ' The CDA broadly
prohibited the use of the Internet to transmit or make available to minors any
indecent speech, while providing narrow safe harbors against prosecution"' (which
the Court found to be unavailable for most noncommercial users for reasons of
technical feasibility and cost213). That the Court reached the right result in ACLU
seems clear under the analysis set forth here, though perhaps for the wrong reasons.
The CDA simply cannot be defended as a regulatory attempt to assist parents in
raising their children, because as the Court pointed out, the CDA gave no control
to parents in deciding what speech was inappropriate for children and criminalized
parental'use of the Internet to send a message to a child that the State deemed
"indecent."2 4 For that reason alone, if parental facilitation is the only permissible
governmental interest in this area, as this Article argues, the CDA obviously cannot
stand. TheACLUCourt, however, did not rely on this reasoning, explicitly leaving
unanswered the question of whether the State may trump parental desires regarding
sexual speech."' Instead, the ACLU Court held that the CDA was not narrowly
tailored to advance the governmental interest in shielding children because of the
availability of less restrictive alternatives, such as parent-controlled filtering
software." 6 This result is probably not consistent with the Court's doctrine, at least
as currently articulated, because such software is not as effective as a ban on
indecent speech. However, it certainly can be defended as a reasonable
accommodation of the competing interests in this area." 7 If the analysis developed
here is accepted, however, the unconstitutionality of the CDA can be demonstrated
much more simply - there is no rational relationship between the regulatory
scheme and the only permissible state objective.
In the aftermath of the ACLU decision, Congress enacted a new statute
regulating indecency on the Internet: the Child Online Protection Act, or
"COPA."2 8  COPA differs from the CDA in that it limits its coverage to
commercial communications via the World Wide Web, and it prohibits only the
distribution of materials that are "harmful to minors"" 9 (the latter term being
... Reno, 521 U.S. at 874-75.
212 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996).
213 Reno, 521 U.S. at 881-82.
214 Id. at 878.
215 id.
216 Id
27 This issue was analyzed thoroughly in Volokh, supra note 15.
218 Child Online Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 231 (1994).
219 Id.
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defined essentially to mirror the Ginsberg obscene-as-to-minors standard 2 1).
Otherwise, the statute is similar to the CDA, notably in its provision of a safe harbor
to web publishers of sexual materials who utilize credit cards or other screening
mechanisms to exclude minors.22' Soon after COPA was enacted, the Third Circuit
enjoined its enforcement on the grounds that COPA was unconstitutional due to the
statute's reliance on a "contemporary community standards" test for defining
material that is harmful to minors.222 Interestingly, in striking down COPA, the
Third Circuit explicitly refused to rely on the trial court's holding (following the
Supreme Court's analysis in striking down the CDA) that COPA failed the narrow-
tailoring requirement of constitutional scrutiny because less restrictive means, in the
form of parent-controlled filtering software, existed to achieve the government's
objectives.223 The court suggested, rather, that parental control is irrelevant because
"such actions do not constitute government action" and therefore are not "lesser
restrictive means for the government to achieve its compelling interest., 224 On
appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit's holding that the
"contemporary community standards" test could not be applied constitutionally to
the Internet (essentially holding that the chilling effect of that definition did not
automatically make COPA overbroad), and it remanded the case to the Third Circuit
for application of the strict scrutiny test to COPA.225
Insofar as the Third Circuit suggested that parental control is irrelevant to
assessing indecency regulations, 226 it seemed to turn proper analysis on its head.
This reasoning would make sense if the only state interest in this area was an
independent interest in shielding children, regardless of parents' desires. As
discussed above, however, that is clearly not the case. At a minimum, it is widely
accepted that parental desires should trump the State's views regarding material
from which minors need to be "protected," but more generally there is a powerful
argument that the only legitimate state interest here is in facilitating parental
220 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 633-35 (1968).
221 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 570-71 (2002).
222 ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 173-74 (3d Cir. 2000), rev'd sub nom. Ashcroft v.
ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002). The Third Circuit reasoned that given the nature of the Internet
and the World Wide Web, and particularly the inability of website operators to screen out
users based on their geographic location, the consequence of applying COPA's definition of
harmful materials would be that every website with sexual material must either adhere to the
standards of the most conservative communities in the United States, as applied to the
youngest of minors, or else limit access using a screening mechanism such as a credit card.
Either "solution" would impose a very substantial burden on speech, and therefore COPA
was unconstitutional.
223 Reno, 217 F.3d at 171 n. 16; see also id. at 181 n.24.
224 Id. at 171 n. 16; see also id. at 181 n.24 ("[T]he parental hand should not be looked to
as a substitute for a congressional mandate.").
225 Ashcrofi, 535 U.S. at 584-86.
226 See Reno, 217 F.3d at 171 n.16; see also id. at 181 n.24.
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control. 2 7 When viewed through the lens of that analysis, it becomes clear that
COPA is highly problematic and should be struck down under strict scrutiny. Like
the CDA, COPA does not directly facilitate parental control over their children.
Instead, it imposes a flat, state-defined (or community-defined) standard of what
materials are inappropriate for minors, and then requires commercial speakers on
the World Wide Web to screen such materials, effectively denying access to the
general public including both adults and minors whose parents do not share the
State's views.22 Of course COPA, like all government-imposed censorship, will
assist parents who share the State's values on child-rearing. Furthermore, COPA-
unlike the CDA - does not punish parents who choose to provide their children
with materials the State deems inappropriate. Moreover, because COPA restricts
only materials which are "obscene as to minors" and thus lack serious value,229 it
seems plausible that many, if not most, parents might share the government's desire
to shield children from such materials. There is, however, a grave problem with this
argument. As constructed, COPA limits access to all speech which is "obscene"
(i.e., offensive and lacking in serious value) as to any minors.23 As a result, speech
deemed offensive and lacking in value as to an eight-year-old would be denied to
a seventeen-year-old (and to many adults). Given the extraordinarily wide diversity
of materials available on the Internet, including political and educational materials
dealing with subjects such as birth control, homosexuality, and sexually transmitted
diseases, it seems entirely inappropriate for the State to assume that all or most
parents would wish their children to be denied access to all such materials simply
because some parents in some communities would consider those materials
"harmful" to very young children. As a consequence, COPA must fail
constitutional scrutiny.
Although the CDA and COPA are both clearly unconstitutional, this does not
mean that the State is powerless to regulate indecent speech on the Internet. As
with cable television, so long as state regulatory efforts are directed at assisting
parents in monitoring or screening their children's access to Internet sites, they
clearly are permissible under current law.2 ' As noted in the ACLU opinion, the
most obvious technology currently available for parents to exercise control over
their children's Internet access is screening software installed on home computers,
which prevents users from accessing websites known to contain graphic language
or content deemed unacceptable to children by the software provider.232 Such
227 See supra Part III.
228 See 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(I) (2000).
229 See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
230 See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
231 I do not fully address here the question of whether such regulations might nonetheless
be struck down because they impose an excessive burden on adult speech, though the issue
is touched upon in the text.
232 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 854-55, 877 (1997); id. at 890-91 (O'Connor, J.,
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software is not fully effective today, however, largely because the size and
constantly changing nature of the Internet makes it very difficult for a software
provider to maintain a complete list of "inappropriate" websites.2 3' This problem
points to one potentially promising and seemingly unproblematic regulatory avenue
for the State to pursue: a mandatory rating system upon which filtering software
could rely. If, for example, a regulatory regime were adopted which established
standards for what types of Internet content is appropriate for minors and which
required website operators to self-rate their content and post the relevant rating in
a manner accessible to filtering software, few constitutional issues would seem to
be raised.134 Furthermore, a ratings system could be keyed to different levels of
sexual content, permitting parents to vary access based on their values and the age
of their children. It is true that the rating requirement would impose some costs on
website operators providing sexually explicit content. Furthermore, those costs
would be more burdensome than in the V-chip context, since speakers on the
Internet constitute a far broader, more diverse, and less consistently affluent group
than commercial television programmers. Nonetheless, the costs seem fairly trivial
in light of the potential gain, and most importantly, under a ratings system, no
speech would be suppressed by the State.2"' Of course, no rating and filtering
system could be fully effective in shielding minors from sexual materials, even
sexual materials of which their parents disapprove, because such a system could not
be imposed on foreign websites and domestic enforcement would be difficult and
burdensome. But the same objection also can be made in relation to censorship
schemes such as the CDA and COPA, which are otherwise far more blunt
regulatory instruments if the State's objective is to facilitate parents' abilities to
monitor and control their children's access to sexually explicit speech.
Filtering software, aided by mandatory ratings schemes, thus seem to be the
obvious regulatory means to achieve the State's legitimate goals in this area. There
is no doubt that some Internet speakers would object to such a scheme because it
would limit their ability to speak to minors whose parents employ filtering software.
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
233 For a comprehensive discussion of the current status of Internet filtering software, see
Am. Library Ass 'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 427-50 (E.D. Pa. 2002), prob.
juris. noted, 123 S. Ct. 551 (2002).
234 Cf Jonathan Weinberg, Rating the Net, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 453 (1997)
(discussing and criticizing proposals to rate Internet sites); id. at 474-76 (arguing that
mandatory rating requirements for websites would violate the First Amendment).
235 A system of voluntary ratings has already begun. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 890-91
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the "Platform for Internet
Content Selection," or"PICS"); LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE
177-82 (1999) (discussing and critiquing current PICS architecture). Such a voluntary
system, however, will necessarily be less effective than a State-imposed system, in which a
failure to comply would constitute a punishable offense.
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But such objections may be dismissed, since website operators have no legitimate
interest in speaking to minors against their parents' wishes, just as speakers
generally have no right to speak to those who do not wish to listen.236
One difficult issue remains, however, regarding the use of filtering software
outside of the home, in places such as the workplace, schools, and most
controversially, public libraries.237 Focusing on the public library context, which
has generated the most interest in recent years, 3 ' the question becomes whether the
use of filtering software, which screens out "indecent" websites on Internet-access
computers in public libraries, constitutes a permissible means for the State to
advance its regulatory goal of assisting parents.239 The dilemma here is fairly clear.
If public libraries fail to use filtering software on computers accessible by minors,
some parents' ability to control their children's access to the Internet inevitably will
236 I do not here discuss the possibility raised by Lawrence Lessig that entities other than
parents, such as Internet Service Providers ("ISPs"), might use ratings and filtering software
to filter all speech, even directed at adults. See LESSIG, supra note 235, at 178-81. Such
misuse of filtering, while troublesome, raises primarily contractual rather than constitutional
issues, and is therefore beyond the scope of this Article.
237 Congress has passed legislation making receipt of certain federal funding by public
libraries contingent on the use of such filters, making it likely that the use of filtering
software in libraries will become much more prevalent in coming years. See Children's
Internet Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of U.S.C.). Recently, however, a three-judge district court panel struck
down this provision on the grounds that the funding condition forced public libraries to
violate their patrons' First Amendment rights. Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F.
Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Pa. 2002). The Supreme Court has noted Probable Jurisdiction in this
case, see United States v. Am. Library Ass 'n, 123 S. Ct. 551 (2002), and should resolve the
issue shortly.
238 But see Neil A. Lewis, Rebels in Black Robes Recoil At Surveillance of Computers,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8,2001, at Al (describing the dispute between Judges on the Ninth Circuit
and the Administrative Office of the Courts regarding monitoring of employees' Internet
usage).
239 I will presume, for the purposes of this discussion, that the use of such software raises
First Amendment issues because it impinges on the free-speech rights of library patrons and
website operators who are screened out, despite the fact that the State has no constitutional
obligation to provide computers in public libraries, or even public libraries themselves. See
Am. LibararyAss 'n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 454-70 (relying on the public forum doctrine to hold
that strict scrutiny applies to public libraries' use of Internet filtering software; Mainstream
Loudon v. Bd. of Trs. of the Loudon County Library, 24 F. Supp. 2d 552, 561-63 (E.D. Va.
1998) (same). I should note, however, that because the State operates libraries in its
proprietary and not its regulatory capacity, the proposition is not an uncontroversial one. See
generally Bernard W. Bell, Filth, Filtering, and the First Amendment: Ruminations on
Public Libraries' Use of Internet Filtering Software, 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 191 (2001). In
keeping with the subject of this Article, I also do not address here the use of filtering software
for purposes other than shielding minors from sexually explicit materials. For a description
of such interests, see Am. Library Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 471-75.
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be compromised (since the only alternative available to those parents, barring their
children's access to the public library, seems unacceptable). On the other hand, use
of filtering software imposes a burden on parents who do wish their children to have
unfettered access to the Internet, especially those families who do not have access
to the Internet at home (as well as on adults, if all computers in a library were
filtered). Absent some means for libraries to calibrate filtering systems to the
desires of individual parents (which today would be administratively impossible),
some conflict is therefore inevitable. In that situation, the State presumably must
be given some discretion to assess how it can best assist parents and to make an
empirical judgment about what sorts of screening devices most parents would
prefer. So long as that judgment appears reasonable and grounded in a factual
inquiry, courts should defer to it, and so long as the burden on adult speech is not
too great (as would be true, for example, if the State set aside some unfiltered
computers for exclusive adult use),24° such ajudgment should survive constitutional
141scrutiny.
CONCLUSION
For the last half-century, our society has struggled to reconcile the
constitutional commitment to free speech with the widely shared desire to shield
children from sexual material deemed inappropriate and harmful. Underlying this
struggle, there have lurked important questions regarding precisely why we believe
children need to be shielded from such materials, and more controversially, who
should decide whether - and when - such shielding is necessary: parents or the
State.
On the first issue, the best and only answer that has emerged thus far is that
children are shielded from sexual materials in order to protect their "ethical and
moral development." On the second point, it has long been accepted, since at least
the 1968 Ginsberg decision, that parents and the State share the power to make the
relevant decisions.242 Furthermore, social and technological realities during most
of this period made it necessary for the State to act in loco parentis, because it was
240 1 do not fully address the question of what sort of burden on adult speech would be too
great to satisfy constitutional requirements. Of course, if the State does have an independent
interest in shielding minors from "indecent" materials, then the argument in favor of filtering
software becomes much more powerful, though the need to balance against the burden on
adult speech remains. As noted in the text, however, libraries could minimize that burden
fairly easily by reserving some unfiltered computers for adult use.
241 Cf Am. Library Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 477-78, 482-83 (finding that the use of
filtering software in public libraries is not "narrowly tailored" to advance governmental
interests because it blocks "significant amounts of constitutionally protected speech,"
including use of such software on computers accessible to minors).
242 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-41 (1968).
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largely impossible for parents to effectively exercise personal control over their
children's access to sexual speech, even with the assistance of the State. This
situation made it unnecessary to examine closely the underlying assumptions and
potential tensions inherent in the Ginsberg analysis.
Recently, however, this consensus has been challenged, most notably by a
majority of the Supreme Court in the Playboy decision, in questioning whether the
State has any legitimate interest in censoring speech that it considers inappropriate
for the "ethical and moral development" of children.243 This Article argues that the
doubts expressed by the Playboy Court are justified. Basic First Amendment
principles, including the long-accepted view that the State may not suppress speech
in order to advance its own orthodoxy of belief, dictate that the State cannot
legitimately seek to control speech because it disapproves of the influence that
speech might have on the values or beliefs of citizens, including minors. On the
other hand, the State does have a legitimate and compelling interest in assisting
parents who wish to control their children's exposure to speech of which the parents
disapprove. Such an interest in no way conflicts with the First Amendment and
indeed is supported by constitutional principles. Most of this Article has explored
the implications of this insight, arguing in particular that the absence of an
independent governmental interest in suppressing indecent speech has many
specific and important implications for permissible regulatory strategies in this area.
The issues explored in this Article have gained particular salience and
importance in recent years, because technological advances, such as the V-chip and
various filtering software, offer the promise of permitting parents themselves - if
they receive proper assistance from the State - to exercise control over their
children's upbringing and exposure to controversial speech without the need for
direct censorship. As such, this new technology offers the possibility of advancing
the core purpose of the First-Amendment, which is to limit official, coercive control
over speech, thoughts, and ideology, while still permitting the State to play an
important role in assisting parents with raising their children to share their values
and beliefs. Of course, there have been - and undoubtedly will continue to be -
many regulatory efforts, such as the Communications Decency Act, which threaten
this promise by adopting censorship rather than filtering as the preferred mode of
regulation. But the First Amendment, as properly interpreted by the courts, should
be (and largely has been) an effective barrier to such efforts.
The truth is, however, that the very technological advances discussed above
may also spell the end of any real hope of shielding children from disfavored
speech. The open architecture and lack of geographic boundaries of the Internet
mean that any regulatory efforts - whether to suppress speech or to assist
parents - can have only limited effectiveness, given the inability to enforce such
standards outside the United States. Furthermore, if the much-touted technological
243 United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
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"convergence" between the Internet and other media truly proceeds, and other
media such as cable television and telephony begin to resemble the Internet in their
architecture, the same inherent shortcomings will limit effective regulation of those
media. In short, the game may be up, and modem regulatory efforts may become
pointless or worse - capable of doing harm but not much good.
The only apparent solution to this dilemma would appear to be some sort of a
regime of international cooperation in setting and enforcing standards to control
indecent speech. If such a regime were to come into being (a perhaps unlikely
prospect, given the range of ideological diversity in the world), it would be
especially important to limit its functioning to facilitating parental control over
access to speech. This is because, in an international regime, the gap between
citizens and decision-makers would be even greater than today. As a result,
regulators could not be trusted to reflect either the desires or the values of most
parents, making any use of censorship or direct regulatory restrictions on speech
deeply problematic as a matter of both democratic theory and constitutional
principle. In short, the current bias in the Supreme Court's constitutional decisions
in favor of parental, rather than state, control over indecent speech, reflected in
cases such as Reno v. ACLU and Playboy, is likely to remain as appropriate and
important as ever, especially as technology and regulatory regimes evolve over the
next few decades.
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